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You’ve got to accentuate the positive 
Eliminate the negative 
And latch on to the affirmative 
Don’t mess with Mister In-Between1 
As international negotiations continue to push toward higher 
standards of global intellectual property (“IP”) protection, a chorus 
of commentators have criticized such initiatives as unbalanced.2 
Critics argue that existing standards of protection already exceed 
socially desirable levels; many denounce the upward ratchet of 
international norms as a rent-seeking enterprise that benefits private 
rightsholders at the public’s expense.3 The perceived lack of balance 
in global policy-making extends beyond substantive norms. Critics 
also object to the process by which global IP norms are formulated as 
fundamentally undemocratic, condemning secretive negotiations in 
which industry insiders enjoy privileged access.4 
The quest for balance in global IP norms has been pressed with 
particular force by developing countries. Developing nations object 
to inflexible mandates, which they see as imposing developed-world 
standards contrary to the interests of development.5 Disillusionment 
over unfulfilled expectations in the aftermath of the 1994 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(“TRIPS Agreement”) intensified their discontent.6 In response, 
developing countries championed the so-called “Development 
 
 1. Johnny Mercer, “‘Remember the 40’s-Music of the War Years,’ Vol. IV, 
1941-45,” CEMA Special Markets (Capitol-EMI) CDL-57367. 
 2. See, e.g., Susan K. Sell, TRIPS Was Never Enough: Vertical Forum 
Shifting, FTAs, ACTA, and TPP, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 447, 448–49, 450–52 
(2011) (describing concerns raised by the push toward “TRIPS-plus” standards 
through bilateral, regional, and plurilateral agreements). 
 3. See Peter K. Yu, Six Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. 
REV. 975, 1028–32, 1036 (2011). 
 4. Id. at 1011–19. 
 5. Neal Weinstock Netanel, Introduction: The WIPO Development Agenda 
and Its Development Policy Context, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1, 2–6 (Neal Weinstock 
Netanel ed., 2009). 
 6. See Sean A. Pager, TRIPS: A Link Too Far? A Proposal for Procedural 
Restraints on Regulatory Linkage in the WTO, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
215, 249–51 (2006) [hereinafter A Link Too Far?]. 
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Agenda” in the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).7 
The Development Agenda espouses the explicit goal of balancing 
the hitherto uncritical promotion of IP rights through harmonized 
standards by redirecting the global IP agenda toward more flexible, 
development-friendly policies.8 
While a broad consensus has emerged over the need to restore 
balance to the global intellectual property system, sharp differences 
remain as to how to conceptualize “balance” and how best to achieve 
it. As the lyrics of the old song have it, there are two ways to 
improve on the status quo: (1) accentuate the positive or (2) 
minimize the negative. These two options point to diverging 
prescriptions for implementing the Development Agenda. This 
article argues that recent commentary has unduly emphasized 
“negative” approaches that seek to minimize harms arising from the 
global IP system rather than actuating its positive potential. It 
criticizes such “subtractionist” strategies as reflecting a one-sided 
approach to development. 
This article advocates a more balanced approach to rebalancing, 
which views developing countries as producers of innovation, rather 
than solely as consumers. It seeks to “latch on to the affirmative” 
potential for IP rights to harness such innovation in the interests of 
development. However, rather than advocating for stronger 
protection by ratcheting upward substantive norms, this article seeks 
instead to “accentuate the positive” potential of the IP system by 
removing barriers that prevent existing IP rights from working 
effectively. In particular, the article calls for refocusing capacity-
building initiatives to better support homegrown innovation in 
 
 7. Daniel J. Gervais, TRIPS 3.0: Policy Calibration & Innovation 
Displacement, in THE DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 51, 53–54 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2009). The 
WIPO Development Agenda led to adoption of forty-five formal recommendations 
in 2007. See World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Provisional Comm. 
on Proposals Related to a WIPO Dev. Agenda (PCDA), June 11–15, 2007, U.N. 
Doc. PCDA/4/3 Prov.2, Annex I (Aug. 20, 2007) [hereinafter WIPO Development 
Agenda], available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/pcda_4/pcda_ 
4_3_prov_2.pdf. A parallel effort within the WTO led to the Doha Declaration, 
which included several provisions seen as furthering development interests in 
intellectual property law. See Gervais, supra, at 54. 
 8. Netanel, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
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developing countries. It further argues that such capacity building 
should prioritize copyright-based creative industries, whose 
developmental potential remains underemphasized. Harnessing such 
capacity for creative development would ameliorate some of the 
present imbalances in the global IP system in ways that are 
preferable to purely “negative” strategies. 
This article contributes to the literature on IP & Development in 
several respects. First, the article departs from the current 
preoccupation with tailoring substantive standards in favor of an 
approach focused on institutional capabilities.9 It argues that 
developing the institutional norms essential for a functioning IP 
regime is more important than fine-tuning legislative reforms; 
rights in statute books are useless unless they can be used in 
practice. Second, it articulates an à la carte model that assesses 
marginal gains from investing in specific capacity-building 
measures.10 In advancing a sector-specific approach to IP 
calibration, this article goes beyond the now-commonplace notion 
that implementation of IP rights should be tailored to national 
circumstances. It argues for further differentiation both between IP 
rights—e.g., copyright vs. patent—and also within specific sectors 
covered by a single right—e.g., educational texts vs. entertainment 
goods. Finally, the article advocates an openly “nativist” approach 
to IP implementation.11 Existing capacity-building efforts have 
emphasized domestic enforcement, which suits the export interests 
of developed countries. Instead, we should prioritize homegrown 
innovation and refocus capacity building around the needs of 
indigenous innovators.  
The argument proceeds as follows: Part I sets out the theoretical 
case for “accentuating the positive” potential of IP rights as a 
rebalancing strategy within the Development Agenda. Part II-A calls 
attention to the enormous creative potential that developing countries 
 
 9. See infra Part II(B)(1). 
 10. See infra Part II(B)(4). 
 11. See infra Part II(B)(1); cf. Sean A. Pager, Patents on a Shoestring: Making 
Patent Protection Work for Developing Countries, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 755, 769 
(2007) [hereinafter Patents on a Shoestring] (defining “nativist” development 
strategies as those which seek to stimulate indigenous innovation by prioritizing 
the interests of domestic innovators). 
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harbor. Part II-B then provides a theoretical framework for assessing 
the cost vs. benefits of incremental measures to harness such 
potential through IP law. Part III-A presents a case study of Nigeria’s 
film industry, “Nollywood,” to illustrate the under-appreciated 
potential for creative industries to drive economic and cultural 
development. Part III-B then explores the comparative advantages of 
copyright as a policy tool to develop such homegrown industries. 
Part IV argues for reorienting capacity building to encourage such 
creative development by empowering domestic authors and 
publishers to make more effective use of the global IP system. It 
proposes specific strategies to “latch on to th[is] affirmative” 
potential. Part V concludes. 
I. THEORIZING BALANCE: THE NEW MATH  
OF DEVELOPMENT DISCOURSE 
As Daniel Gervais explains, “IP & Development” has been the 
subject of competing discourses of “addition” vs. “subtraction,” 
which parallel the “positive” vs. “negative” approaches identified 
above.12 Proponents of the “addition” approach generally advocate 
aggressive expansion of global IP protection as a “power tool for 
development” that would spearhead investment and innovation in 
developing countries.13 They call for the international community to 
support such expansion by providing developing countries “model 
laws” to ease their integration into the global IP system.14  
Gervais describes how the addition approach became discredited 
in the aftermath of the TRIPS Agreement.15 Uncritical acceptance of 
IP’s potential gave way to an opposing subtraction narrative, which 
saw intellectual property rights functioning primarily as obstacles to 
development. For subtractionists, less rather than more IP is the 
answer.16 They encourage developing countries to make maximal use 
of the flexibility that global IP treaties allow to mitigate the harms of 
existing commitments while opposing the adoption of new ones. 
 
 12. Gervais, supra note 7, at 52–53. 
 13. Id. at 52; KAMIL IDRIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: A POWER TOOL FOR 
ECONOMIC GROWTH 2, 3 (2003). 
 14. See Netanel, supra note 5, at 7. 
 15. Gervais, supra note 7, at 52–53; see also Netanel, supra note 5, at 8. 
 16. Gervais, supra note 7, at 53. 
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Subtractionist strategies encompass a wide spectrum, including (a) 
expansive interpretations of exceptions and limitations; (b) issuance 
of compulsory licenses; (c) scrutiny of anticompetitive practices; (d) 
an embrace of alternative paradigms for IP such as open innovation 
and traditional knowledge rights; and (e) demands for extrinsic 
concessions such as preferential access to technology on non-market 
terms.17 
Gervais argues we have now arrived at a third “calibration phase,” 
which acknowledges the diversity among developing countries and 
rejects one-size-fits-all solutions.18 He sees the WIPO Development 
Agenda as the “poster child” for the calibration approach in which a 
more nuanced approach to IP protection prevails and adjusts 
implementation strategies according to the level of development of 
the individual country.19  
This article aligns with Gervais’s calibration approach. I do not 
suggest that IP rights should be a priority for every developing 
country, nor would I claim that the current global IP regime strikes 
an optimal balance in its substantive mandates.20 Furthermore, I 
acknowledge that building an innovation ecology around IP rights 
entails significant challenges. The costs of enforcing exclusive rights 
typically arrive long before the benefits. Realizing the upside 
requires sustained effort and investment. Getting laws on the books 
is the easy part. Putting in place the supporting institutional 
infrastructure to enable such laws to function is harder. And breeding 
a culture of legal norms to sustain and develop this legal 
 
 17. For a recent exemplar, see generally The Washington Declaration on 
Intellectual Property and the Public Interest, GLOBAL CONG. ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. & THE PUB. INTEREST 2, 3, 6 (2011), available at http://infojustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/09/Washington-Declaration.pdf [hereinafter Washington 
Declaration]. 
 18. Gervais, supra note 7, at 54 (stating that the calibration approach 
recognizes that differences in developing countries necessitate different 
implementations of TRIPS). 
 19. Daniel Gervais, Foreword to IMPLEMENTING WIPO’S DEVELOPMENT 
AGENDA xi–xii (Jeremy DeBeer ed., 2009). 
 20. For example, deferring the patent-protection mandate for the least 
developed countries makes sense, as do expanded flexibilities for access to 
knowledge. The goal of this article is not to reject the subtractionist agenda, as 
such, but rather to complement it with a “positive” component focused on IP-
driven development. 
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infrastructure is hardest of all.21 The extent to which developing 
countries can justify such implementation efforts will vary according 
to their individual circumstances. Nonetheless, this article suggests 
that developing countries would benefit from undertaking these 
challenges in a selective, cost-effective manner. It advocates an à la 
carte approach to IP calibration that is sector specific and 
unabashedly nativist: countries should harness IP law to serve the 
needs of their own innovators.22 
The reality, however, is that Gervais’s comforting account of a 
“third phase” represented by the calibration model masks a schism in 
global IP policy that remains, if anything, more polarized than ever. 
As noted at the outset of this article, developed countries continue to 
push an aggressive agenda of TRIPS-plus standards.23 In response, 
subtractionists have launched a variety of counter-offensives, ranging 
from the high-profile campaign over access to medicines to the less 
successful push for an access-to-knowledge (“A2K”) treaty.24 
Meanwhile, alternative paradigms such as open innovation and 
traditional knowledge rights continue to garner significant policy 
attention within the evolving Development Agenda,25 and IP 
abolitionists press their case with renewed vigor.26 Far from being 
 
 21. See generally MART LEESTI & TOM PENGELLY, COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. RIGHTS, INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICYMAKING, ADMINISTRATION & ENFORCEMENT 32–
34 (2002), available at http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/ 
apcity/unpan017421.pdf (describing gaps in expertise and institutional capacity as 
significant constraints on IP regimes in developing countries). 
 22. See infra notes 134–150 and accompanying text. 
 23. See Sell, supra note 2, at 448 (describing the push by developed countries 
for higher IP protection standards through bilateral, regional, and plurilateral 
negotiations). 
 24. See Amy Kapczynski, THE ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE MOBILIZATION AND 
THE NEW POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 806–07 
(2008). 
 25. Id. at 806, 858–59; Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 465, 531–34 (2009). 
 26. Old-school dependency theorists arguing that IP is inherently against the 
interests of developing countries have been bolstered by the new abolitionism 
advanced by digital anarchists. Compare Alan Story, Burn Berne: Why the 
Leading International Copyright Convention Must Be Repealed, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 
763, 767–68, 792 (2003) (arguing that international copyright conventions are 
inherently biased in favor of wealthy corporate copyright owners against the 
economic and access-to-knowledge interests of copyright users in developing 
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assured of any consensus, developing countries are therefore 
buffeted by conflicting agendas and competing narratives. Accepting 
the calibration model hardly resolves the tensions between such rival 
visions of IP law. It merely brings us back to the challenge noted 
above: how to define and operationalize “balance.” 
Of the two extremes, the developed world’s TRIPS-plus agenda 
has attracted the greatest critique. A wealth of commentary has 
savaged the case for ratcheting upward global standards, accusing its 
proponents of dodgy statistics, misleading/self-serving arguments, 
and undemocratic abuses of process.27 Such “IP maximalism” is easy 
to caricature as the product of corporate monopolists whose 
protectionist agenda would steal from poor countries to make rich 
ones richer.28 The result has been a polarized North–South discourse 
in which the interests of developing countries appear to align with IP 
skeptics. 
In previous work, I have criticized maximalist conceptions of IP 
rights as failing to take into account the full array of stakeholder 
 
countries), with Eben Moglen, Anarchism Triumphant: Free Software and the 
Death of Copyright, 4 FIRST MONDAY (1999), http://firstmonday.org/htbin/ 
cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/684/594 (arguing digital networks will 
underwrite the triumph of anarchist production over proprietary models based on 
IP rights). A burgeoning literature on IP’s “negative spaces” has also emerged. See  
Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, A Theory of IP’s Negative Space, 34 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 
317, 319–20 (2011) (describing how innovation can flourish within creative 
communities such as open-source software in the absence of intellectual property 
protections). IP abolitionists even have their own political party in Europe. See 
Francis Gurry, Copyright in the Digital Environment: Restoring the Balance, 35 
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 5 (2011) (describing the emergence of the Pirate Party to 
contest elections on the basis of abolition or radical reform of intellectual property 
and copyright laws). 
 27. See Sell, supra note 2, at 459–61 (claiming that the IP enforcement 
agenda’s platform is characterized by “strategic obfuscation”); Yu, A Tale of Two 
Development Agendas, supra note 25, at 555 (critiquing IP maximalist initiatives 
for their lack of transparency); see also Joe Karaganis, Rethinking Piracy, in 
MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES 1, 4–18 (Joe Karaganis ed., 2011) (noting 
that the record and movie industries have used erroneous or unsupported figures in 
documenting financial losses to piracy). 
 28. See Anupam Chander & Madhavi Sunder, The Romance of the Public 
Domain, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 1331, 1353–54 (2004) (criticizing the international IP 
regime for establishing asymmetric standards of protection that facilitate the 
transfer of wealth from poorer countries to richer countries). 
  
2012] ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE 231 
 
interests, including those of developing countries.29 I also have 
proposed concrete measures to achieve more balanced outcomes.30 In 
this article, however, I want to shift targets to warn of the reciprocal 
danger posed by the subtractionist agendas that have mobilized in 
opposition. Such “negative” strategies approach IP rights as a threat 
instead of an opportunity. Viewing developing countries as 
consumers rather than producers of intellectual property, they 
advance an unduly narrow vision of “balance” in which the 
development interest inheres in maximizing the negative spaces 
within the IP system. 
As an exemplar of this new subtractionist agenda, this article 
examines the so-called “Washington Declaration.” An international 
coalition of academics, activists, and civil society representatives 
promulgated this manifesto in 2011, purporting to catalogue the 
public interest in IP law.31 While the Declaration lacks legal force, it 
presents a broad synthesis of IP-related policy concerns, which, at 
last count, has attracted more than 900 signatories.32 As such, it 
offers a snapshot of current thinking from the self-styled “public 
interest” perspective on IP law. 
The crux of the Washington Declaration lies in its cogent warning 
against the “risks of intellectual property maximalism.”33 As a 
reaction against the TRIPS-plus agenda being pushed elsewhere, the 
Declaration’s emphasis on the costs rather than benefits of IP rights 
is understandable. Moreover, to its credit, the Declaration does 
 
 29. See A Link Too Far?, supra note 6, at 244 (identifying public choice 
concerns in international IP negotiations that may lead to suboptimal outcomes that 
permanently disadvantage developing nations). 
 30. See id. at 268–270 (proposing procedural reforms to restrain future IP 
harmonization); Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 796–97 (suggesting that 
developing countries price patent fees to shift the economic burdens of protection 
onto rich countries). 
 31. Washington Declaration, supra note 17. I participated in Global Congress 
held at American University Washington College of Law in August 2011, which 
led to the Declaration, and I agreed with enough of its recommendations to add my 
name to the signatories. Accordingly, this article should be viewed more as a 
“concurring opinion” than a dissent. 
 32. See generally The Washington Declaration on Intellectual Property and the 
Public Interest, INFOJUSTICE.ORG, http://infojustice.org/washington-declaration 
(last visited Aug. 23, 2012) (showing signatories). 
 33. Washington Declaration, supra note 17, at 1. 
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acknowledge that “[i]ntellectual property can promote innovation, 
creativity and cultural development.”34 In other words, the 
Declaration recognizes that properly tailored IP rights themselves 
advance important public interests. Rather than a global indictment 
of IP law a priori, the Declaration correctly identifies the concern 
over IP law as being merely “too much of a good thing.”35  
My concern, however, is that in proposing to “put IP law in its 
place”36 through a vigorous and comprehensive pruning, the 
Washington Declaration constructs a dichotomy between “private vs. 
public interest” in which the public interest appears almost 
synonymous with the public domain. While the Declaration pays lip 
service to the “importance of reasonable enforcement of properly-
bounded intellectual property rights,”37 its substantive proposals 
contemplate approaching this promised land of “reasonable IP” 
entirely through an agenda of subtraction.  
Putting IP law in its place by cutting it down to size makes sense if 
we assume a status quo of “too much” IP. Yet this diagnosis only 
rings true in the aggregate. The real picture is more complicated. 
Assessing “reasonableness” and “balance” in the current IP system 
requires not just consideration of the substantive rights presently 
enacted but also examination of how these rights are actually being 
used. In many contexts, the problem may be “not enough” IP rather 
than “too much.” Because IP rights themselves serve important 
public interests, we should be concerned about imbalances in both 
directions: underprotection, as well overprotection. 
Subtractionist agendas respond to the perception that rightsholders 
are exploiting private entitlements at the expense of the public 
interest. At the same time, for many authors and inventors, the 
benefits of IP protection remain troublingly out of reach. By seeking 
to “eliminate the negative” side of IP rights, without considering 
ways to “latch on to the[ir] affirmative” yet unrealized potential, 
subtractionists address only one side of the public-interest equation. 
They fail to consider the public interest in equalizing the 
 
 34. Id. I would add economic development to this list of benefits of IP 
protection. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See id. at 2. 
 37. Id. at 5. 
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opportunities to benefit from the global IP system. 
It is important to recognize that “accentuating the positive” 
contribution of IP rights in this manner need not entail ratcheting up 
substantive standards. Indeed, such a “positive” agenda is entirely 
consistent with efforts to resist or roll back IP maximalism. Rather 
than expanding rights, this version of IP positivism focuses on 
expanding their effectiveness on behalf of marginalized communities 
through capacity building. By harnessing IP rights on behalf of a 
broader array of stakeholders, we would ensure a more equitable 
distribution of benefits. 
Concerns over access barriers are pervasive even in developed 
countries. A recurrent criticism of IP regimes is that they 
discriminate against independent authors, inventors, and start-up 
businesses.38 The U.S. Copyright Office’s recent proposal for small 
claims dispute resolution responds to such concerns explicitly.39 
Similar policy concerns function in the realm of patent law.40 For 
example, the U.S. Patent Office’s reduced fee structure for small 
entities has the aim of encouraging independent inventors and 
entrepreneurs.41 Other jurisdictions tackle the problem by providing 
 
 38. See, e.g., Steven T. Lowe, Death of Copyright, 28 COMPUTER & INTERNET 
LAW. 1, 3–5 (2011) (describing how big studios infringe the rights of screenwriters 
with impunity); Vivek Wadhwa, Where Are the Jobs? Ask the Patent Trolls, 
WASH. POST, May 7, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/on-
innovations/where-are-the-jobs-ask-the-patent-trolls/2012/05/07/ 
gIQAdIE08T_story.html (describing how software patents disproportionately deter 
innovation by start-ups); cf. WIPO Development Agenda, supra note 7 annex I, at 
1 (calling for “particular emphasis on the needs of small and medium-sized 
enterprises”). 
 39. See Remedies for Copyright Small Claims, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, 
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/smallclaims/ (last visited Aug. 15, 2012) 
(describing the need for less expensive, more efficient mechanisms to adjudicate 
small copyright claims). 
 40. See, e.g., Jason Rantanen et al., America Invents, More or Less?, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 229, 232 (2012) (describing a concern that a shift to a first-to-file 
patent system will harm small inventors by favoring firms with more resources to 
draft and file applications quickly); see also Small & Medium-Sized Enterprises, 
NO SOFTWARE PATENTS!, http://www.nosoftwarepatents.com/en/m/dangers/ 
sme.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) (“[T]he patent system in general has a 
reputation for increasingly putting [small and medium-sized entities] at a 
disadvantage . . . .”). 
 41. See Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 798 (suggesting that 
developing countries would benefit from similar tiered pricing schemes that favor 
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rights in sub-patentable innovation, allowing inventors to bypass the 
more expensive and cumbersome patent system.42 My purpose here 
is not to advocate the merits of any particular proposal; I merely 
want to suggest that a public interest agenda can—and arguably 
should—include measures to ensure more equitable access to IP 
protection, rather than focusing solely on preserving access to the 
public domain. 
The potential benefits of encouraging broader utilization of 
existing IP regimes carry particular force when it comes to 
developing countries. In many such countries, IP rights exist more on 
paper than in actual practice.43 For domestic authors and inventors 
denied the benefits of a functioning IP regime, underprotection is a 
far greater concern than overprotection. 
Because the foundations of an intellectual property system remain 
largely unsettled, to speak of “putting IP in its place” in the 
development context amounts to a virtual non-sequitur. IP rights 
function in developed economies against a backdrop of established 
mechanisms for acquisition, licensure, and enforcement. However, in 
developing countries, such baseline norms cannot be taken for 
granted. Therefore, calibrating the appropriate “level” of IP 
protection requires attention not just to substantive rights but also to 
the way norms and institutions function in context. 
Developing countries are justifiably skeptical of IP rights. Their 
potential as a “power tool” for development has often been oversold 
and the difficulties in realizing such potential overlooked.44 
 
domestic inventors). 
 42. J.H. Reichman, Of Green Tulips and Legal Kudzu: Repackaging Rights in 
Subpatentable Innovation, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1743, 1754 (2000) (proposing a 
liability rule regime to effectively create “portable trade secrets”).  See generally 
Mark D. Janis, Second Tier Patent Protection, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 151, 151–52 
(1999) (surveying “petty patent” models, which feature short-term protection based 
on less rigorous protection standards, without prior examination of substantive 
validity). 
 43. See JEREMY DE BEER & CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & 
SUSTAINABLE DEV., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TRAINING AND EDUCATION: A 
DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVE 2 (ICTSD Issue Paper No. 31, 2010), available at 
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2010/11/iptrainingandeducation.pdf (stating that “in 
developing countries, there is a wide gulf between IP laws on the book and the 
day-to-day realities”). 
 44. See id. (criticizing “simplistic and false” conceptions of IP’s potential). 
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Proponents of global IP rights have placed an exaggerated 
and unrealistic emphasis on attracting foreign investment and 
technology transfer.45 Opponents focus on the burden of royalties 
extracted by foreign rightsholders.46 Such trade-focused arguments 
have arguably eclipsed the primary rationale for IP law: namely, 
encouraging innovation at home.  
Rather than rejecting IP rights as an alien appendage foisted upon 
them by external pressure, developing countries should consider their 
positive, yet unrealized, potential to function as engines of domestic 
innovation. Authors and inventors in developing countries deserve 
the same opportunity, enshrined in human rights law, to benefit from 
their creativity as their developed-world counterparts.47 Moreover, 
there are compelling reasons for supporting homegrown innovation 
as a pathway to sustainable development; increased technology 
transfer from developed countries is no substitute.48 
Simplistic expectations that IP rights will serve as a magical cure-
all should be rejected. However, reflexive opposition is equally 
unproductive. Rather, countries should explore the ways in which IP 
rights can advance their national interest. Even if IP rights appear a 
losing proposition overall, this should not preclude investments in 
capacity building in specific sectors of the IP system where prospects 
appear favorable. This article argues that copyright-driven 
development of domestic creative industries presents a strong 
candidate for realizing such net benefits. 
 
 45. See id. at 13. 
 46. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 28, at 1354 (noting that, in 1999, 
developing countries paid $7.5 billion more in royalties than the royalties they 
received, while the United States experienced an $8 billion increase in its surplus 
of royalties related to IP transactions between 1991 and 2001). 
 47. Cf. U.N. ESCOR, 35th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 at 3, 5 (Jan 12, 
2006) (describing the human right of authors to receive adequate remuneration). 
 48. Homegrown innovation is more likely to be adapted to local needs in ways 
that yield positive externalities and result in sustainable development. By contrast, 
imported technology may arrive without the tacit know-how required to utilize it 
effectively, and, if tied to foreign investment, its continued development remains 
hostage to the fickle priorities of foreign capital. See Peter Yu, TRIPS and Its 
Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 376 (2006). Engaging domestic 
knowledge workers in the production of innovation also helps to prevent brain 
drain. Cf. WIPO Development Agenda, supra note 7, at 5 (requesting that WIPO 
assist developing countries in efforts to prevent brain drain). 
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Skeptics may question the ability of developing countries to 
compete in global media markets or cast doubt on their 
administrative capacity to implement effective IP regimes. Concerns 
over lack of technological capacity and market access bolster such 
doubts, as does the belief that IP rights are better suited to developed 
economies than developing ones. Given the empty promises that 
fueled pro-IP agendas in the past, such skepticism is to be expected. 
Rhetoric about incentivizing innovation has too often served to mask 
corporate interests. Is this case any different? 
Arguably, yes, for three reasons. First, models of IP development 
driven by FDI/tech transfer models were inherently bounded and 
destined to disappoint. As we now know, IP is only one factor among 
multiple criteria determining investment, and there are only finite 
pools of foreign capital to allocate in an often fickle investment 
climate.49 By contrast, creativity is a boundless and universal 
resource. Developing countries do not need to compete against other 
states to garner the benefits of homegrown innovation.  
Second, the incremental investments entailed to help domestic 
innovators tap into the global IP system can be quite modest. 
Developing countries can take advantage of sunk costs as well as 
piggyback on existing resources provided by others. In some cases, 
merely providing informational resources can yield tangible benefits. 
Third, developing countries do not need to undertake 
comprehensive reforms. The approach advocated here is explicitly 
selective and opportunistic. Developing countries can focus their 
capacity-building investments on sectors where the prospects appear 
most favorable and pursue subtractionist strategies elsewhere. 
Such a calibrated approach to IP & Development would allow 
developing countries to balance their interests as both producers and 
consumers of innovation in a blend of short-term and long-term 
strategies. By contrast, purely subtractionist approaches neglect the 
potential for developing countries to realize an upside from IP rights 
and fail to acknowledge the de facto underprotection inherent in the 
 
 49. See Gervais, supra note 7, at 57–58 (noting that other factors determine 
foreign direct investment, such as the trade regime, tax and competition laws, 
geopolitical and commercial forces, market liberalization and deregulation, 
technology development policies, competition regimes, and corruption levels). 
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status quo. Such one-sided visions of the “development interest” 
reinforce the trope that developing countries do not produce the sort 
of innovation that IP law is designed to incentivize.50 As Part II 
explains, the creative potential of the developing world remains both 
under-recognized and under-exploited. Justified skepticism about IP 
law should not blind us to the value of incremental steps to 
encourage its development. 
II. EXPLORING IP’S UPSIDE 
A. IS CREATIVITY DEAD IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD? 
We normally think about intellectual property as the province of 
giant Western entities—Hollywood, the RIAA, BSA, IFPI, 
Pharma—who collectively produce and control the world’s most 
valuable forms of innovation. Such industry groups and their 
corporate members have legions of well-paid lawyers and lobbyists 
at their beck-and-call and can direct vast resources to administer and 
enforce their IP rights. By contrast, the target of their enforcement 
efforts are many in number but often small in size—college students 
engaging in peer-to-peer file sharing and shadowy vendors peddling 
illicit wares in back alleys or on “rogue” websites. Such apparent 
Davids attract sympathy in their battle against the Goliaths of Big 
Content/Big Tech. Yet, for creators in developing countries, the 
struggle to exploit their intellectual property reverses this calculus, 
with rightsholders cast more in the role of David than Goliath. 
That such struggles occur at all is rarely acknowledged. From the 
standpoint of Western commentators and policy-makers, developing 
countries figure in IP enforcement debates primarily as centers of 
piracy, rather than as its victims. Discourse on global intellectual 
property rights in the developed world centers overwhelmingly on 
efforts to crack down on such “pirate” nations.51 Under pressure from 
industry, Western governments have made the prevention of 
intellectual property “theft” a foreign policy priority, with global 
norm-setting in intellectual property law focused on ever more 
 
 50. Mark Schultz & Alec van Gelder, Creative Development: Helping Poor 
Countries by Building Creative Industries, 97 KY. L.J. 79, 79, 136 (2008). 
 51. See Karaganis, supra note 27, at 8. 
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draconian enforcement. Such efforts may be framed in lofty rhetoric 
about incentivizing global innovation, but their subtext is clear: we 
need to stop people “over there” from stealing the valuable 
intellectual property that we make “here.”52  
Conversely, discourse from the development standpoint often 
remains preoccupied with the inequalities in the global IP regime. 
The specter of colonialism hovers, as anti-imperialist invective flows 
freely.53 Efforts to advance IP norms are dismissed as rent-seeking on 
behalf of Disney and Pfizer. The acrimonious history of the TRIPS 
Agreement makes such ingrained suspicions understandable.54 
Moreover, TRIPS’s status as an annex to the World Trade 
Organization Treaty has conditioned developing countries to 
approach IP law primarily as a trade issue.55 The simplistic portrayal 
of IP rights as “royalty transfer mechanisms” similarly encourages a 
focus on mitigating losses or extracting offsetting compensation 
while blinding policy-makers to possible upsides.56  
 
 52. See, e.g., The Truth About Rogue Sites Legislation: Facts and Fiction, 
DIR’S GUILD OF AM. (Jan. 17, 2012), http://www.dga.org/News/Guild-
News/2012/January-2012/The-Truth-About-Rogue-Sites-Legislation.aspx 
(claiming that piracy facilitated by rogue websites overseas jeopardizes U.S. jobs). 
 53. See, e.g., Anthony R. Noss, Note: In Defense of TRIPS: It Only Seems 
Imperialistic, 1 CYBARIS INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 154, 156 (2010) (responding to 
widespread criticisms of the WTO’s flagship IP treaty as imperialistic); Peter K. 
Yu, Toward a Nonzero-Sum Approach to Resolving Global Intellectual Property 
Disputes: What We Can Learn from Mediators, Business Strategists, and 
International Relations Theorists, 70 U. CIN. L. REV. 569, 580 (2002) (citing 
similar criticism). 
 54. See Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 48, at 373–74 (describing 
the view of TRIPS Agreement as a coercive, imperialistic instrument that turns the 
WTO into a rent collector for multinational corporations). Rather than being freely 
consented to in a stand-alone treaty, TRIPS’s mandatory minimum standards 
arrived as a non-negotiable pillar of WTO membership. IPR is viewed thus as an 
“unconscionable bargain” imposed under duress for the benefit of external 
rightsholders. See A Link Too Far?, supra note 6, at 244–45, 249. 
 55. The acronym “TRIPS” itself advertises a focus on “trade-related aspects” 
of IP protection. 
 56. Schultz & van Gelder, supra note 50, at 89–90 (describing how policy-
makers ignore the creative potential  harbored within developing nations); see 
Robert Sherwood, Intellectual Property: A Chip Withheld in Error, in 
COMPETITIVE STRATEGIES FOR THE PROTECTION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 73, 
82 (Owen Lippert ed., 1999) (suggesting that expanded IP protections could 
actually benefit developing nations). 
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As critical commentators hammer home the message that IP rights 
are irredeemably biased toward Western interests,57 the notion that 
such rights might stimulate indigenous innovation loses credibility.58 
Even IP boosters inadvertently reinforce the notion that technology is 
something that must be “transferred” from abroad.59 As a result, 
policy-makers in developing countries gravitate toward alternative 
paradigms such as sui generis protection for traditional knowledge, 
an information commodity in which they supposedly hold a 
comparative advantage.60 
Yet, is the North–South “innovation divide” really so intractable? 
Even practitioners of traditional culture continue to innovate in ways 
that stand to benefit from conventional IP protection.61 Moreover, 
 
 57. See, e.g., Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics 
of Possessing Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 
CAN. J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 249, 285 (1993) (describing existing IP doctrine as 
reflecting “particular interested fictions emergent from a history of colonialism that 
has disempowered most of the peoples on this planet”); Angela Riley, Recovering 
Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in Indigenous Communities, 18 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 177–78 (2000) (criticizing “flagrant dismissal of 
non-Western viewpoints in . . . interpretation of copyright law”). 
 58. Incentive theories are dismissed as just another fairy tale proffered by 
Disney. Cf. COPYRIGHT AND OTHER FAIRY TALES: HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN 
AND THE COMMODIFICATION OF CREATIVITY 9-13 (Helle Porsdam ed., 2006) 
(arguing that copyright law encourages corporate commodification of culture in 
ways that impoverish the public domain and inhibit innovation). 
 59. Schultz & van Gelder, supra note 50, at 83–85. 
 60. Indeed, it is telling that the Washington Declaration’s one and only call for 
increased IP protection concerns traditional knowledge. Preserving traditional 
knowledge may be important, but it does nothing to equip developing countries to 
compete in the information economy of the future. Moreover, IP rights should not 
be viewed as antithetical to traditional knowledge; rather, properly regulated, they 
offer the principal means by which source communities can unlock its value. Sean 
Pager, Folklore 2.0: Preservation Through Innovation, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Folklore 2.0] (manuscript on file with American 
University International Law Review). 
 61. See Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, 70 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 97, 110–12 (2007) (documenting innovation by cultural 
practitioners of traditional handicrafts and arguing that IP protection could benefit 
such practitioners). Furthermore, encouraging innovation is not the only rationale 
supporting IP rights. Trademark law, for example, can be justified based on 
consumer protection, a rationale that applies with particular force in developing 
countries where alternative safeguards are often deficient. See Marshall Leaffer, 
The New World of International Trademark Law, 2 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 
1, 6 (1998) (expressing concern that consumers in developing countries could be 
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innovation in the developing world is hardly confined to the realm of 
tradition. Human creativity is a universal resource. People in 
developing countries are just as richly endowed in artistic talent, 
imagination, and inventive spirit as their developed-world 
counterparts.62 Their need for practical problem-solving and self-
expression provides just as powerful drivers. That such creative 
impulses have not hitherto been effectively channeled into 
commodified forms valued by the global IP system does not mean IP 
is necessarily a losing proposition.  
The biggest source of pessimism about Southern innovative 
capacity concerns disparities in the patent system. Schultz & van 
Gelder have noted the tendency in IP & Development discourse to 
conflate IP protection entirely with patents.63 Such conflation is 
unfortunate, because patents present by far the least favorable 
prospects. Patents are expensive and difficult to procure, they require 
a high bar of inventiveness, and merely to compete often requires 
access to sophisticated equipment and know-how.64 Commercializing 
patented technology imposes further hurdles.65 As such, the benefits 
of global patent protection are undeniably skewed in favor of 
technologically advanced countries in the developed world.66 
Yet, even here, the case for pessimism should be qualified. 
Developing countries are hardly monolithic. Some developing 
countries have technology sectors that already compete at the 
forefront of global innovation, and others are not far behind.67 Even 
 
defrauded or exposed to health risks by counterfeit goods). 
 62. Sherwood, supra note 56, at 74, 76. 
 63. Schultz & van Gender, supra note 50, at 86. 
 64. See Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 757, 765. 
 65. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 28, at 1351–52 (describing 
disadvantages that developing countries face competing in global patent markets). 
 66. Cf. Moshaid Khan et al., WIPO, World Patent Report: A Statistical Review 
7, 16 (2008) (showing that a handful of developed nations dominate global patent 
procurement). 
 67. See id. at 16, 29 (noting that China now ranks in the top ten countries in 
global patent procurement); Shamnad Basheer & Annalisa Primi, The WIPO 
Development Agenda: Factoring in the “Technologically Proficient” Developing 
Countries, in IMPLEMENTING THE WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
ORGANIZATION’S DEVELOPMENT AGENDA, 100, 101–02 (Jeremy de Beer ed., 
2009) (criticizing development discourse based on simplistic dichotomy of 
developing vs. developed countries as failing to account for the growing 
  
2012] ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE 241 
 
countries that lack sophisticated industries may produce cutting-edge 
academic research that, with more effective technology transfer 
mechanisms, could be patented and commercialized.68 
Moreover, innovation comes in many forms. Useful innovation 
can emerge even without relying on advanced technology, as the 
“frugal innovation” movement demonstrates.69 Such incremental 
improvements often serve to tailor existing technology to local 
needs.70 Because it is adapted to the local context, such homegrown 
innovation offers advantages to technology produced abroad, which 
proactive policies can encourage.71 Even developing countries that do 
not stand to benefit from patent protection should therefore consider 
alternative means to foster such innovation, whether through utility 
 
technological sophistication of developing nations such as India, China, Brazil, and 
Russia). 
 68. Catherine Saez, Developing Countries Need Help to Get Research Results 
Patented, IP Proponent Says, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 5, 2012, 2:49 PM), 
http://www.ip-watch.org/2011/05/10/developing-countries-need-help-to-get-
research-results-patented-ip-proponent-says/ (examining a case study in the 
Philippines). 
 69. Philipp Aerni & Dominik Rüegger, Making Use of E-Mentoring to Support 
Innovative Entrepreneurs in Africa, in WORLD TRADE FORUM, TRADE 
GOVERNANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 436, 438 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 
2012) (describing how “frugal innovation” caters to the needs of low-budget 
consumers through “simple, low-energy, reusable and often recyclable” 
technologies); Martin Labbe, Harnessing Information and Communication 
Technologies for Development: The Trade-Related Technical Assistance 
Perspective, in WORLD TRADE FORUM, TRADE GOVERNANCE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
421, 424 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012) (noting that frugal innovation 
such as inexpensive smartphones will extend the benefits of digitally networked 
technology even to the least developed nations); Asian Innovation: Frugal Ideas 
Are Spreading from East to West, ECONOMIST, Mar. 24, 2012, 
http://economist.com/node/21551028 (explaining how Asian engineers “re-
imagine” Western products in a manner that is cost-efficient and thereby 
affordable for “ordinary” Asians). 
 70. Sherwood, supra note 56, at 79 (documenting how ceramic companies in 
Ecuador make innovations in their products and processes in response to local 
needs). 
 71. Id. at 82 (arguing that homegrown innovation can be advanced through the 
adoption of enhanced IP protection); Robert Sherwood et al., Promotion of 
Inventiveness in Developing Countries Through a More Advanced Patent 
Administration, 39 IDEA 473, 478 (1999) [hereinafter Promotion of Inventiveness] 
(asserting that developing countries should promote homegrown innovation as a 
driver of economic growth, “even to the point of subsidizing the cost of patent 
acquisition by individual (local) inventors”). 
  
242 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:1 
 
model protection, trade secret law, or sui generis schemes.72 Even 
trademark law and geographical indications protection have a place 
in innovation policy.73  
The notion of an “innovation divide” is even less supportable 
when one moves to the realm of copyright law. Global copyright 
regimes impose far lower entry barriers than patent. Worldwide 
protection is available immediately without any formalities upon 
fixation of a work, and only a modicum of originality is needed.74 
Production costs and distribution bottlenecks are used to restrict 
entry to the commercial content industries. However, such barriers 
have fallen rapidly in recent decades.75 
To be sure, production of copyrighted content as a global 
commodity remains skewed in favor of developed countries.76 Yet 
developing countries increasingly figure not just as consumers of 
imported media (whether authorized or not) but also as producers 
 
 72. KHAN ET AL., supra note 66, at 25–26 (noting utility model regimes are 
disproportionately relied on by domestic inventors); Robert Sherwood, Trade 
Secret Protection: Help for a Treacherous Journey, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 67, 104 
(2008) (describing benefits of trade secret protection). Experimentation in this 
realm offers profitable terrain for an opportunistic nativism that tailors protection 
to maximize local interests. See Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 802–806 
(recommending developing countries consider sui generis protection schemes 
specifically tailored to domestic inventors). 
 73. See Chander & Sunder, supra note 28, at 1365. 
 74. See Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works art. 
5(2), Sept. 9, 1886, 1161 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Berne Convention] (stipulating 
that the rights in literary and artistic works are not subject to any formality); see 
also Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 362 (1991) (stating 
that originality does not require that facts be presented in “an innovative or 
surprising way”). 
 75. See Folklore 2.0, supra note 60 (manuscript at 17, 23) (analyzing how 
lowered barriers to entry have enabled an exponential growth of Nigeria’s film 
industry). 
 76. See, e.g., UNCTAD & UNDP, Creative Economy: A Feasible Development 
Option, 145, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DITC/TAB/2010/3 (2010) [hereinafter 
UNCTAD Report] (stating that the international music trade is “dominated by 
developed economies,” which account for about eighty to ninety percent of world 
trade in music goods); Sean A. Pager, Beyond Culture vs. Commerce: 
Decentralizing Cultural Protection to Promote Diversity Through Trade, 31 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 63, 66 (2011) [hereinafter Beyond Culture vs. Commerce] (noting 
that Hollywood commands an eighty-percent share of the global box office, raising 
the concern that American popular culture threatens a “mental colonization” that 
would “enslave the rest of the world to American thought and values”). 
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and exporters. The creative industries they harbor have become 
important drivers of economic growth.77 India’s Bollywood, long 
dominant in domestic film markets, has in recent decades expanded 
its distribution to global audiences.78 Nigeria’s video film industry—
“Nollywood”—has emerged as the dominant player in Africa.79 
Egyptian films are watched across the Arab world.80 Latin American 
telenovelas and Turkish soap operas command their own global 
following.81 Meanwhile, the world music and world beat circuit has 
become one of the music industry’s fastest-growing genres.82 From 
Jamaican reggae and dancehall to West African blues, a diverse array 
of artists has claimed the mantle of global superstardom. Behind 
iconic names such as Bob Marley, Youssou Ndour, and Ali Farka 
Touré lies a much broader array of musical talent from Tuvan throat-
singers to Tuareg nomads, who cater both to newly affluent 
consumers at home and regional and niche audiences abroad.83 
Publishing output in developing countries has also dramatically 
expanded, often exploiting new media to reinvigorate traditional 
 
 77. UNCTAD Report, supra note 76, at 19–22. 
 78. See Beyond Culture vs. Commerce, supra note 76, at 118 (stating that 
Bollywood’s overseas box office revenues increased tenfold between 1981 and 
2001, and have more than doubled since). 
 79. Folklore 2.0, supra note 60 (manuscript at 15). 
 80. UNCTAD Report, supra note 76, at 220 (reporting that more than seventy-
five percent of the 4,000 short and feature-length films made in the Arab world 
since 1908 have come from the Egyptian film industry, which during its peak 
produced as many as seventy feature films a year). 
 81. J.P. Singh, Culture or Commerce? A Comparative Assessment of 
International Interactions and Developing Countries at UNESCO, WTO, and 
Beyond, 8 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 36, 49 (2007) (asserting that Latin American 
telenovelas are now watched by 2 billion people worldwide). 
 82. UNCTAD Report, supra note 76, at 59–60. 
 83. See, e.g., Singh, supra note 81, at 51 (describing proliferation of 
homegrown creative industries in emerging markets); Diana Barrowclough & 
Zeljka Kozul-Wright, Voice, Choice and Diversity, in CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND 
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: VOICE, CHOICE AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 17 (Diana 
Barrowclough & Zeljka Kozul-Wright eds., 2007) (noting rising consumption of 
entertainment goods by emerging middle classes in the developing world); Anne S. 
Lewis, Finding Their Tuva, AUSTIN CHRON. (Oct. 10, 2003), 
http://www.austinchronicle.com/screens/2003-10-10/181055/ (chronicling the 
musical connection between a San Franciscan blues musician and throat-singers in 
Russia’s Autonomous Republic of Tuva). 
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genres.84 From cartoons based on Indian legends and mythology to a 
Kenyan youth comic-cum-radio show, what unites these works is 
their ability to tap new markets of consumers hungry for innovative 
local content.85 Such diverse output reaffirms the world’s rich 
cultural heritage and rebuts outdated narratives of cultural 
imperialism. If the economic benefits of such creative output have 
not always been shared equitably, such concerns only underscore the 
need to strengthen domestic commercial capacity.86 Moreover, by 
giving voice to fresh perspectives and rediscovered traditions, the 
value of these emerging creative industries transcends their economic 
bottom line.87 Their success has become a source of pride and 
identity and a locus of democratic discourse.88  
 
 84. See, e.g., OCTAVIO KULESZ, ALLIANCE INTERNACIONAL DES ÉDITEURS 
INDÉPENDANTS, DIGITAL PUBLISHING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 89, 124 (2010) 
(describing how the growth of digital networks in China has led to the emergence 
of online literature portals that facilitate new genres of expression); The East Is 
Read: The Internet Is Changing Chinese Literature, ECONOMIST, Mar. 10, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21549989 (describing how, in China, the recent 
outpouring of online fiction has come to include both “newly popular online 
genres, such as romance,” and fiction possessing traditional “Chinese 
characteristics,” such as grave-robbing stories). 
 85. Vikas Bajaj, In India, New Life for Comic Books as TV Cartoons, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 20, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/20/business/global/ 
20comics.html?pagewanted=all (describing how multimedia platforms have given 
new life to Indian comic strips based on historical and religious traditions); Tristan 
McConnell, Shujaaz: More Than Just a Comic Book, GLOBAL POST (Nov. 17, 
2011, 11:00 AM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatches/globalpost-blogs/africa-
emerges/shujaaz-more-just-comic-book (describing how distribution of Shujaaz, a 
Kenyan comic strip, spans platforms ranging from leading national newspapers to 
the radio and the Internet); Emily Wither, Kenyan Youth Find Their Superhero, 
CNN (Apr. 12, 2011), http://articles.cnn.com/2011-04-21/world/kenya.radio.comic 
.shujaaz_1_kenyan-youth-radio-show-bright-ideas?_s=PM:WORLD (describing 
how Boyie, a character on the Shujaaz radio show, educates the program’s young 
listeners on such everyday topics as farming, making money, human rights, and 
“staying out of trouble”). 
 86. See J. Michael Finger, Introduction to POOR PEOPLE’S KNOWLEDGE: 
PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 2–4 (J. Michael 
Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004) (arguing that improving domestic capacity in 
developing countries to empower indigenous innovation would lead to a more 
balanced distribution of benefits from global IP rights). 
 87. Barrowclough & Kozul-Wright, supra note 83, at 12, 30; Folklore 2.0, 
supra note 60. 
 88. Sean Pager, Digital Content Production in Nigeria and Brazil: A Case for 
Cultural Optimism?, in TRANSNATIONAL CULTURE IN THE INTERNET AGE 262, 273 
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Underlying this diversification of global media flows are powerful 
forces rooted in technology and globalization. Digital technologies 
have dramatically altered the economics of cultural industries. Even 
last-generation technology, available in inexpensive, off-the-shelf 
packages, can provide dramatic efficiency gains in the production 
and distribution of creative content.89 Digital media enable 
decentralized patterns of distribution, allowing producers to reach 
isolated or rural audiences long excluded from consumption of 
analog media.90 “By lowering barriers to entry, such technologies 
allow creative industries to flourish in developing countries in ways 
that were unimaginable decades earlier.”91 
Globalization has also fostered consumer interest in exploring the 
world’s diverse cultural traditions. Global migration patterns have 
distributed pockets of diverse populations with a particular interest in 
maintaining ties to the cultural production of their homelands.92 
 
(Sean A. Pager & Adam Candeub eds., forthcoming 2012) [hereinafter Digital 
Content Production] (“By providing members of . . . historically excluded groups 
the technical skills and equipment to create, record, and publish original digital 
content, [the Brazilian Culture Points program] confer[s] recognition, pride, and a 
sense of belonging to the multiple subcultures that make up Brazil’s incredibly 
diverse populace.”); see also Singh, supra note 81, at 51 (explaining that creative 
artists in developing countries have played a major role in “destabilizing existing 
power relations,” such as in the case of albino singer Salif Keita, who has 
“explicitly challenged Malian cultural notions that viewed albinos as bearers of 
evil”). 
 89. See Beyond Culture vs. Commerce, supra note 76, at 122 (detailing how the 
lower-cost thresholds for digital filmmaking “make it possible to recoup 
investments on a much smaller revenue than a few decades prior,” as exemplified 
by Nigeria’s “Nollywood” film industry and its reliance on home video 
distribution). 
 90. Digital technologies also enable outsourcing of cultural production by 
artists in the developed world to lower-cost producers in developing countries. 
Animation work and music videos are increasingly done in this manner. See Ben 
Sisario, Needing an Artist, and Calling on India, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/17/business/media/outsourcing-extends-to-
creative-work.html (describing how independent musician Drew Smith contracted 
a dance school in India to create a music video for his song “Smoke and Mirrors,” 
which cost a mere $2,000 to produce and received more than 179,000 views on the 
Internet). 
 91. Digital Content Production, supra note 88, at 266. 
 92. See Singh, supra note 81, at 49–50 (stating that Bollywood, India’s film 
industry, “now considers South Asian diaspora markets as a major source of 
revenue”); Bajaj, supra note 85 (stating that half of the purchases from Indian 
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Moreover, digital technology has enabled new decentralized 
pathways for content distribution, allowing producers to tap such 
“diversity markets” through physical disks (CDs, DVDs) offered in 
ethnic groceries, or via online platforms, both specialized and 
general (YouTube, Facebook).93  
Yet the story of these emerging creative industries is as much 
about unrealized potential as it is about commercial success. Even as 
digital technologies enable new forms of production and distribution 
that unlock markets and empower creative expression, they also 
undermine content producers’ ability to control and profit from such 
distribution. Artists in developing countries confront market 
conditions in which commercial piracy is pervasive. Unable to 
recoup their creative investments, fledgling industries struggle for 
survival. The developmental potential such creative industries 
represent remains hamstrung by this persistent market failure.94  
Creative industries in developing countries are hardly unique in 
facing challenges from digital piracy. In this respect, their position 
mirrors that of their Big Content counterparts in the West. Yet their 
positions are hardly symmetrical when it comes to copyright 
enforcement. Western multinationals can amortize losses to piracy 
across multiple markets and rely on branding and other alternative 
revenue sources to recoup their investments. Content producers in 
developing countries are typically small entities with far more 
limited resources and clout.95  
 
publishing company Amar Chitra Katha’s website, featuring “Indian-style Aesop’s 
fables, religious parables, and biographies of historical figures,” are shipped 
abroad to Indian immigrants in the United States hoping to use the books to help 
connect their children to their cultural roots). 
 93. Beyond Culture vs. Commerce, supra note 76, at 122 (claiming that, in 
addition to ethnic grocery stores and mail-order services like Netflix, which cater 
to diaspora audiences and specialty interests, “the advent of on-demand video 
streaming could potentially bring even greater revenues”). 
 94. Schultz & van Gelder, supra note 50, at 127–30 (identifying harms 
attributable to piracy that include “preventing creators from securing capital to 
finance their work, pushing the surviving recording industry to developed 
countries, and undermining local trade”). 
 95. See BURAMA K. SAGNIA, INT’L NETWORK FOR CULTURAL DIVERSITY, 
STRENGTHENING LOCAL CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND DEVELOPING CULTURAL 
CAPACITY FOR POVERTY ALLEVIATION 13 (2005), available at, 
http://www.incd.net/docs/Sagnia%20Report%20-%20Strengthening%20Local%20 
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Such asymmetries are particularly glaring when it comes to export 
markets. For Big Content, copyright enforcement in emerging 
markets is primarily a rule-of-law issue. In theory, creative industries 
from emerging markets should not face reciprocal handicaps in 
enforcing their rights in the West. Mature economies such as the 
United States have well-defined norms that empower copyright 
owners to target infringers through a variety of enforcement 
mechanisms, backed by a legal infrastructure that functions 
efficiently to translate rights into remedies. Yet emerging-market 
rightsholders face other handicaps, including (a) unfamiliarity with 
intellectual property norms generally; (b) unfamiliarity with the 
specific legal regimes established in Western countries; (c) limited 
resources to devote to rights management and enforcement; and (d) 
lack of distribution networks to negotiate licenses, monitor 
infringement, and undertake enforcement. As a result, producers of 
creative content in developing countries often forgo potential profits 
from Western markets, and much of the distribution of such content 
remains, by default, unauthorized.96 
As Part IV will elaborate, more effective capacity building could 
help emerging content producers overcome these obstacles. It is easy 
to see how such measures could benefit the industries concerned. 
However, can such investments be justified in terms of the public 
interest as a whole? Answering this question requires a more 
contextualized cost–benefit analysis. The following section provides 
a framework to guide that analysis.  
 
Creative%20Industries.pdf (stating that, in developing countries, most of the 
activities classified under creative industries tend to be small and medium-sized 
enterprises that operate largely within the informal economy); Schultz & van 
Gelder, supra note 50, at 130 (explaining that most African musicians lack access 
to effective collective rights organizations and face threats to their independence 
from their own governments). 
 96. See Adrian Athique, The Global Dynamics of Indian Media Piracy: Export 
Markets, Playback Media and the Informal Economy, 30 MEDIA, CULTURE & 
SOC’Y 699, 713–14 (2008) (describing how the bulk of Indian film distribution 
overseas is conducted by informal, pirate networks); DE BEER & OGUAMANAM, 
supra note 43, at 22 (describing unauthorized distribution of Nigerian movies in 
diaspora markets in the developed world). 
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B. WEIGHING COSTS VS. BENEFITS  
Many developing countries are skeptical of intellectual rights and 
rightfully so. Some remain convinced that the costs of IP protection 
vastly outweigh the benefits. A handful of domestic artists and 
inventors may experience private gains, but what about the costs of 
restricted access to technology and textbooks, the strain on judicial 
and administrative resources, and the drain of foreign royalty 
payments siphoned off-shore? Developing countries face many 
pressing needs: education, public health, transportation, etc. Can they 
really justify commandeering scarce social resources to enforce IP 
rights? 
Moreover, can developing countries realistically expect to 
compete in global innovation markets? At first blush, the statistics 
are daunting. Not only do Western countries lead global patent 
procurement tables, but they also dominate trade in copyrighted 
media and claim the world’s most valuable brand names.97 Given 
such dominance, how can developing countries possibly stand to 
gain from investing in IP when the lion’s share of benefits will be 
claimed by foreigners? 
These are valid questions. On the public vs. private concern, it is 
worth noting that the benefits generated by IP systems extend beyond 
private gains to rightsholders. Innovation-based enterprises generate 
economic multiplier effects through employment, productivity gains, 
secondary consumption and investment, tax revenues, follow-on 
innovation, and so forth. The full value of such societal spillovers is 
hard to quantify. However, such multiplier effects are more likely to 
be generated from homegrown creativity than from imports. The 
cumulative benefits of innovation are better appreciated in the 
context of technology than copyright. However, policy-makers 
elsewhere have recognized that homegrown media contribute to 
public discourse and cultural development in ways that clearly 
 
 97. See Bashir & Primi, supra note 67; 2011 Rankings of the Top 100 Brands, 
INTERBRAND http://www.interbrand.com/en/best-global-brands/best-global-brands-
2008/best-global-brands-2011.aspx (last visited Aug. 31, 2012) [hereinafter 2011 
Rankings] (showing that developed countries claimed ninety-nine of the world’s 
top hundred most valuable trademarks in 2011, with the United States 
monopolizing all of the top ten spots and Mexico’s Corona Beer constituting the 
only entry from a developing nation (ranking eighty-sixth)). 
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transcend their economic bottom line.98  
At the same time, we should be forthright in acknowledging that 
intellectual property regimes carry costs—both direct and indirect. 
Some of these costs can be recovered through pricing structures built 
into the IP system.99 However, societal costs include higher prices, 
restrictions on access to knowledge, and risk of anti-competitive 
abuses.100 There are also opportunity costs to weigh—both public and 
private.101 For some—maybe most—developing countries, the 
intellectual property system will entail a net drain on fiscal resources 
in the short-to-medium term. Yet, just because something has costs 
does not mean it is not worth doing. 
Reaching an informed decision to invest in IP capacity requires 
weighing costs and benefits carefully. Such appraisal should ideally 
proceed from a comprehensive assessment that considers both public 
and private interests, over short-term and long-term horizons. 
Striking this balance appropriately depends heavily on context; each 
 
 98. See Beyond Culture vs. Commerce, supra note 76, at 71 (describing 
benefits from homegrown creative industries, which facilitate an internal discourse 
that enables “each culture to evolve on its own terms rather than having the process 
driven by cultural imports”). 
 99. See LEESTI & PENGELLY, supra note 21, at 39–41 (stating that, in some 
developing countries, the revenue from service fees for IP rights administration 
exceed operating expenditures). Indeed, IP systems in the developed world 
routinely operate as profit centers that generate surplus revenues from registration 
fees. Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 795 (arguing that rather than 
merely defraying expenses, patent fees “represent an important policy lever 
regulating the dispensation of monopoly rights and ensuring that such rights are 
put to economic use”). Developing countries could arguably be far more 
aggressive in exploiting such revenue potential while minimizing the adverse 
impact of higher fees on domestic innovators. See id. at 790–801 (recommending 
that developing countries should implement “a broader research subsidy program 
of which funding to secure IP rights locally . . . and internationally would comprise 
but one component”). 
 100. Charging hefty maintenance fees can also serve to partially mitigate such 
external costs by encouraging rightsholders to let economically unproductive rights 
lapse. Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 789 (offering empirical evidence 
suggesting that many developing nations have under-utilized the potential policy 
that maintenance fees afford). 
 101. See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentives-Access 
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 487–88 (1996) (identifying opportunity costs 
associated with intellectual property regimes, including lost access to existing or 
future works of authorship and the siphoning of labor and capital from other 
economic sectors for the production of copyrighted works). 
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country has its unique circumstances and will assess its priorities and 
values differently. As noted, developing countries span a wide 
spectrum. Some are well on their way to developing creative clusters 
and technology hubs that can already benefit from IP rights. Others 
face less promising prospects. However, even developing countries 
whose outlook is clouded with doubt should not overlook the 
potential for silver linings. 
Four general considerations should guide this analysis. First, the 
inquiry should focus on marginal gains from undertaking specific 
incremental measures. Even if intellectual property as a whole 
represents a losing proposition, there may still be cost-effective ways 
to realize an upside. Second, the focus should be on prospective 
advantage. Where returns on IP investments require longer-term 
commitments, appropriate discounting for the time-value of money 
should be applied. However, expecting immediate payoffs is 
unrealistic. Third, IP systems should not be viewed as a zero-sum 
equation. The extent to which benefits accruing to foreign 
rightsholders translate into losses at home varies significantly 
according to the specific sector of IP concerned. That being said, 
countries should not hesitate to employ “nativist” measures that 
disproportionately favor domestic firms where feasible and 
appropriate. This leads to the fourth consideration: rather than 
viewing IP as a holistic system, investments in capacity building, 
where possible, should be targeted on a sector-specific basis. The 
following paragraphs elaborate on each of these points in turn. 
1. Incremental Investments 
First, most developing countries are legally obligated to enforce IP 
rights under treaty commitments to which they are bound. Even 
countries unconvinced of the value of IP regimes have likely gone 
some way toward meeting their international obligations, if only to 
appease foreign pressure. Such sunk costs represent opportunities. 
Developing countries should think creatively about how to maximize 
the benefits they derive from their investments in institutional 
capacity, especially where the incremental costs of doing so appear 
modest. Rather than building costly white elephants solely to appease 
foreign demandeurs, they should think about turning such 
institutions and expertise to their advantage—putting their 
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institutional resources and expertise to work on behalf of their own 
nationals, helping domestic creators to exploit their IP rights and 
navigate the global IP system.102  Moreover, developing countries 
can defray their capacity-building investments through registration 
and maintenance fees.103 
Second, such opportunistic policies can piggyback on resources 
provided by third parties. As Part IV details, a variety of external 
providers already offer capacity building and technical assistance to 
developing countries.104 Developing countries should be much more 
proactive in soliciting assistance targeted to their specific needs and 
priorities. Similarly, capacity-building investments facilitating 
exports shift the costs of IP exclusivity onto foreign jurisdictions and 
may also take advantage of external enforcement capabilities.105 
Finally, an “incremental gain” approach serves, in part, to answer 
concerns about Western dominance. A developing country does not 
need to challenge Hollywood’s hegemony over global blockbusters 
to realize the benefits of a national film industry. Where specific 
investment in copyright capacity building could help such a film 
industry develop in ways that generate positive marginal returns, 
then such investments can be justified on their own terms. 
2. Prospective Gains 
A focus on prospective benefits supplies a further answer to 
concerns over Western dominance. As investment brochures 
routinely caution, past performance is no guarantee of future results. 
Today’s global hegemon may become tomorrow’s also-ran, 
supplanted by more nimble upstarts. The point of IP protection is to 
 
 102. For relevant suggestions with respect to patent institutional design, see 
Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 777–78, 797–806 (exploring patent-
protection policy levers such as tiered fee pricing, subsidies to local producers, and 
ancillary service charges). 
 103. While such fees could be treated as a source of general revenue and be 
reinvested elsewhere, reinvesting the proceeds internally in IP capacity would 
arguably position developing countries to justify charging much higher fees. See 
Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 794 (arguing that where developing 
countries can justify higher fees “as necessary to recover the underlying expenses 
of their patent system,” they have a stronger basis for asserting compliance with 
TRIPS’s prohibitions against “unnecessary costliness”). 
 104. See infra notes 228–237 and accompanying text. 
 105. See infra notes 138–139 and accompanying text. 
  
252 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:1 
 
create prospective incentives, which means the focus should be on 
net benefits going forward (while applying appropriate discounting 
for the time-value of money and other opportunity costs). 
Digital technologies are exerting powerful leveling effects on 
innovation. Leapfrog technologies such as cloud computing and 
mobile Internet put cutting-edge capabilities within reach of 
Southern entrepreneurs.106 As Part III elaborates, the lowering of 
entry barriers to commercial content industries has been even more 
dramatic.107 Moreover, other extrinsic factors are also narrowing the 
innovation gap. Global investors, including technology-focused 
venture capital funds, are also increasingly looking for growth 
opportunities in emerging markets.108 The growth of South−South 
commerce holds particular promise to boost innovative 
capabilities.109 
 
 106. Aerni & Rüegger, supra note 69, at 441 (noting that, in sub-Saharan Africa, 
improved efforts to connect people to the Internet via cell phones, Internet cafes, 
school laptops, and other resources are likely to allow small entrepreneurs to 
“overcome the physical and institutional bottlenecks which were created largely by 
omission”); Labbe, supra note 69, at 421–24 (asserting that, as a result of the 
increasing expansion of the Internet and mobile networks in developing countries, 
even people in the least-developed economies will have access to sophisticated e-
commerce platforms); Digital Revolution: Makers of Mobile Devices See a New 
Growth Market, ECONOMIST, Apr. 7, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/ 
18008202 [hereinafter Digital Revolution] (describing how the cell phone is 
“swiftly becoming Africa’s computer of choice”); Not Just Talk: Clever Services 
on Cheap Mobile Phones Make a Powerful Combination – Especially in Poor 
Countries, ECONOMIST, Jan. 27, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18008202 
(predicting that rapidly growing Internet accessibility will “boost the continent’s 
information and entertainment business and allow African media houses . . . to 
expand their businesses around digital content tailored to local languages and 
markets”); Tanks in the Cloud: Computing Services Are Both Bigger and Smaller 
Than Assumed, ECONOMIST, Dec. 29, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/ 
11797794 (explaining that emerging digital technologies allow developing 
countries to benefit from advanced computing services without having to build 
expensive infrastructure). 
 107. See infra Part III. 
 108. See Seema Mody, Why Are VCs Investing in Emerging Markets? Mobile 
Innovation, CNBC (Nov. 21, 2011, 4:04 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/45389717/ 
Why_Are_VCs_Investing_in_Emerging_Markets_Mobile_Innovation. 
 109. See Aerni & Rüegger, supra note 69, at 437–39 (describing how investors 
from developing countries have experience overcoming the challenges of operating 
in emerging markets); From Russia with Bandwidth: A Russian Start-Up Shows 
How 4G Wireless Might Work, ECONOMIST, Aug. 19, 2010, 
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Furthermore, even if IP protection initially favors foreign 
rightsholders, one should not view such asymmetric benefits as 
permanently ordained. The failure to commercialize Southern 
innovation partly springs from a lack of familiarity with the IP 
system as well as a lack of supporting infrastructure.110 More 
effective capacity building would reduce such handicaps. More 
generally, much of the disadvantages that developing countries face 
in global innovation markets result from their late entry. Knowledge 
economies are dynamic and depend on cumulative investments over 
time.111 IP regimes likewise require a host of supporting institutions 
and practices to function effectively.112 As developing countries 
develop the capacity to mobilize their innate creative resources, the 
benefits they realize from IP protection will increase. However, 
opting into IP systems requires more than just flipping a switch.113 
Some investment in IP capacity building now can therefore be 
justified as a down payment toward the future. 
3. Non-Zero-Sum Calculus and Nativism 
Furthermore, even if Western firms continue to reap the lion’s 
share of benefits from the global IP system, this does not mean 
developing countries cannot benefit as well. Such non-zero-sum 
calculus is easiest to illustrate with respect to trademark law. As 
noted, Western firms possess the world’s valuable brand names.114 
 
http://www.economist.com/node/16846752 (stating that Yota, a Russian start-up 
that has already expanded to provide 4G wireless service to Belarus, Nicaragua, 
and Peru, hopes to add two more countries each year); Internet Investment’s New 
Champions: The Emerging Online Giants, ECONOMIST, July 8, 2010, 
http://www.economist.com/node/16539424 (describing how Cape Town−based 
Naspers, Africa’s biggest media group, has the largest portfolio of Internet firms in 
developing countries, including Brazilian comparison-shopping site BuscaPé and 
Indian social network ibibo). 
 110. Saez, supra note 68 (arguing that a lack of infrastructure in developing 
countries hampers their ability to translate indigenous innovation into commercial 
gain). 
 111. Sean Coughlan, Battle of the Knowledge Superpowers, BBC NEWS (Sept. 
28, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-14949538 (describing European 
plans to invest “innovation clusters”). 
 112. See Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 25, at 567. 
 113. See Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, supra note 48, at 377 (describing the 
risk that entrenched “pirate industries” will block investments in IP protection). 
 114. 2011 Rankings, supra note 97. 
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Does this mean that trademark protection is a bad deal for 
developing countries? In fact, trademark registration by domestic 
companies in most developing countries vastly outnumbers 
registration by foreigners.115 Such companies stand to benefit from 
protection of their marks at home, even if they never mature into 
global brands. Moreover, consumers also stand to benefit to the 
extent that trademark law safeguards them against deceptive 
practices by competitors. Such consumer benefits occur even where 
foreigners hold the marks being enforced.116 Therefore, so long as the 
anticompetitive effects of trademark protection are held in check, the 
domestic gains are fairly unambiguous.117 
By contrast, the benefits of patent protection are far less certain. 
Foreigners are far more likely to dominate patent procurement, and 
the societal costs are likely to outweigh any gains. In theory, 
according patents to foreign inventors could encourage technology 
transfer or lead to specific investments in innovation tailored to the 
needs of developing countries. In practice, such gains are likely to 
prove modest and be dwarfed by the dead-weight losses that patent 
exclusivity engenders.118 These include licensing fees, restraints on 
technological development, and diminished competition.119 
Accordingly, foreign domination in the patent domain is far more 
likely to translate directly to domestic losses, in a classic zero-sum 
scenario. 
Copyrights fall somewhere in between trademarks and patents. 
The blocking power conferred by copyrights is far less robust than 
 
 115. See Int’l Chamber of Commerce [ICC], Making Intellectual Property Work 
for Developing Countries, at 1–2, ICC Doc. No. 450/1003 (July 19, 2005). 
 116. Cf. Daniel Chow, Counterfeiting as an Externality Imposed by 
Multinational Companies on Developing Countries, 51 VA. J. INT’L L. 785, 800 
(2011) (noting that the proliferation of unsafe and hazardous counterfeit drugs and 
substandard food presents serious health and safety hazards to consumers in 
developing countries). 
 117. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common 
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687, 1695–97 (1999) (criticizing U.S. trademark law for 
exceeding its traditional pro-competitive moorings). 
 118. See A Link Too Far?, supra note 6, at 240 & n.109. 
 119. See Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 756–57 (describing concern 
that patents may impinge on the economic prosperity of developing countries by 
limiting their access to vital technology and thereby “relegating them to a future of 
economic dependency”). 
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with patents.120 The entry barriers for domestic authors and 
publishers are far less daunting. For some categories of copyrighted 
works, the costs of exclusivity still merit concern. Software, 
scientific publications, and educational materials all generate 
significant societal spillovers; diminished access due to copyright 
protection may translate into societal detriments.  
However, not all copyrighted works justify the same degree of 
societal concerns. Increased costs of entertainment, for example, 
merely shift consumption patterns to rival goods. In the case of 
foreign media, such shifted consumption due to copyright may be 
beneficial. Reducing piracy of imported media raises prices but also 
levels the playing field for domestic producers.121 Critics of media 
imperialism have long objected to Hollywood’s practice of “cultural 
dumping”—i.e., undercutting local producers through cut-rate 
pricing.122 From the standpoint of domestic competitors, piracy is the 
ultimate form of cultural dumping. Just as governments erect 
protectionist barriers or direct subsidies to their cultural industries to 
shield them from competition, placing a “copyright tax” on imported 
media can have the effect of subsidizing local production.123  
The costs of copyright enforcement—both direct and indirect—can 
thus be partly justified as investments in cultural diversity.124 
 
 120. Unlike patent, copyright does not allow rightsholders to block independent 
creations, nor does it confer exclusivity in ideas or methods. 
 121. For example, sales of works by U.S. authors were undercut by piracy of 
British works in the nineteenth century. Their protests were instrumental in 
Congress’s decision to extend U.S. copyright protection to foreign authors. See 
Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 893 (2012). 
 122. See, e.g., HARRY REDNER, CONSERVING CULTURES: TECHNOLOGY, 
GLOBALIZATION, AND THE FUTURE OF LOCAL CULTURES 77 (2004). 
 123. See Matilda Bilstein, South Africa’s Movie Piracy Challenge, 1 AM. U. 
INTELL. PROP. BRIEF 27, 31 (2010) (arguing that local creators will benefit from 
greater domestic copyright protections since the market for local work will 
otherwise be undermined by pirated foreign works). 
 124. This link between copyright enforcement and cultural diversity explains 
why France has led the way in implementing a “graduated response” to crack 
down on file sharing. The French justify their “three-strikes” law based on the 
belief that online piracy hurts local industries in their struggle against Hollywood. 
See Lyombe Eko, American Exceptionalism, the French Exception, Intellectual 
Property Law, and Peer-to-Peer File Sharing on the Internet, 10 J. MARSHALL 
REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 94, 146–48 (2010) (stating that France’s law criminalizing 
unauthorized peer-to-peer file sharing was aimed at creating “a French cultural 
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Substituting homegrown cultural expression for foreign-made content 
is also associated with a variety of positive societal externalities.125 
Moreover, increasing the supply of locally produced content not only 
benefits consumers through increased choice, but over time it exerts 
downward pricing pressure on imported media.126 In sum, enforcing 
copyright on entertainment goods has strong non-zero-sum attributes. 
Even where the most immediate benefits go to foreigners, society may 
emerge better off. Arguments against a zero-sum calculus do not, 
however, mean developing countries should be indifferent to local vs. 
foreign benefit. On the contrary, domestic innovation is far more 
likely to generate positive spillovers and should be prioritized 
wherever possible.127 Such a “nativist” perspective implies a selective, 
opportunistic approach to capacity building. Open discrimination in 
favor of domestic firms may violate the national treatment provisions 
enshrined in TRIPS and other international agreements.128 That being 
said, countries should not hesitate to work within the legally 
permissible framework to favor domestic firms where feasible. Some 
forms of capacity building can be more readily targeted than others. 
For example, an efficient judiciary benefits foreign and domestic 
rightsholders alike. However, national governments retain discretion 
in targeting enforcement efforts and can prioritize sectors of concern 
to local firms.129 Charging tiered fees according to firm size can 
 
imprint on the online multi-media distribution industry”). 
 125. See Beyond Culture vs. Commerce, supra note 76, at 71 (noting that 
defenders of cultural protection highlight national identity, democratic discourse, 
and cultural diversity as justifying support of domestic cultural production). 
 126. Karaganis, supra note 27, at 58–61; Beyond Culture vs. Commerce, supra 
note 76, at 71. 
 127. See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
 128. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods art. 3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, Legal Instruments – 
Results of the Uruguay Round, 108 Stat. 4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter 
TRIPS Agreement] (stipulating that each Member State shall afford to the 
nationals of other Member States treatment “no less favourable than it accords to 
its own nationals with regard to the protection of intellectual property); Berne 
Convention, supra note 74, art. 5 (providing that “an author [who] is not a national 
. . . shall enjoy . . . the same rights as national authors”). 
 129. Panel Report, China – Measures Affecting the Protection and Enforcement 
of Intellectual Property Rights, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009) [hereinafter China – 
Measures]. Informal discriminatory practices appear fairly common. See 
Karaganis, supra note 27, at 28. 
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generally ensure that foreigners shoulder a higher share of the 
operating expenses that IP systems incur.130 Subsidies can also be 
directed to local firms with only minimal constraints under WTO 
law.131 Moreover, some intellectual property regimes may fall outside 
non-discrimination commitments entirely.132   
4. Sector Specificity 
Developing countries should therefore be strategic in their 
decisions to latch on to the affirmative potential of IP rights. The 
decision to invest in IP capacity building should not be viewed as a 
holistic “all-in” commitment. And it certainly does not entail acceding 
to the maximalist agendas being pushed by developed countries. 
Instead, the challenge is to devise appropriate strategies to 
maximize gains and minimize costs. Countries should look at IP as 
more of an à la carte menu and determine where their priorities lie. A 
minimum level of trademark and trade secret protection will likely 
prove advantageous in any context.133 Beyond that, for many 
developing countries, creative industries offer attractive 
developmental potential; copyright law also offers a more accessible 
regime to domestic creators than patent. Yet, even within the realm 
of copyright law, countries should be discriminating: they can 
condemn commercial, industrial-scale verbatim copying as piracy, 
 
 130. Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 798-800 (asserting that such a 
tiered fee system may be advantageous to developing countries given that small 
entities will be primarily local whereas larger ones will be “overwhelmingly” 
foreign, “resulting in de facto price discrimination that can tax and deter foreign 
applicants through high prices without disadvantaging local ones” as well as 
ensure that foreigners fund the bulk of operational costs and capacity-building 
investments in developing country patent systems). 
 131. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 5, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 
1A, Legal Instruments — Results of the Uruguay Round, 1867 U.N.T.S. 14 
(allowing nonagricultural domestic subsidies so long as they do not cause “adverse 
effects to the interest of other Members”). 
 132. See Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 805–06 (describing how sui 
generis intellectual property regimes “could be structured to discriminate de facto 
without much cause for objection”). 
 133. Almost every country has commercial entities with proprietary information 
and established trademarks. Therefore, protecting these interests will inure to the 
benefit of domestic stakeholders. Moreover, a modest level of protection in these 
areas should not significantly encumber third-party interests. 
  
258 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. [28:1 
 
for example, while carving out liberal exceptions for transformative 
works and access-to-knowledge needs.134 
To be sure, treaty commitments impose substantive minima and 
forbid overt discrimination. Yet national governments retain 
substantial discretion as to how they implement these 
commitments.135 Developing countries therefore can and should be 
strategic in their policy choices. They should play to their strengths, 
emphasizing forms of intellectual property in which they hold 
potential advantages and prioritizing capacity building to develop 
those sectors.136 This might mean, for example, choosing to 
concentrate enforcement efforts on particular sectors (e.g., film but 
not software).137  
Finally, even where domestic IP capacity lags (for example, due to 
systemic institutional weaknesses), developing countries should not 
overlook the potential afforded by global IP regimes externally. 
Helping domestic authors and inventors exploit their IP in overseas 
markets shifts the costs of IP exclusivity onto other countries while 
internalizing the benefits. It takes advantage of other countries’ 
existing institutional capacity (funded at the expense of foreign 
taxpayers) and allows domestic authors to piggyback on foreign 
 
 134. International copyright law allows many avenues to exercise such 
flexibility, such as through expansive fair-use allowances, compulsory licenses for 
linguistic translations, price regulation of educational materials, and open-source 
licensing. See Margaret Chon, Intellectual Property “From Below”: Copyright 
and Capability for Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 803, 847–54 (2007) . 
 135. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 128, art. 1 (declaring that states party to 
TRIPS “shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the 
provisions” of the agreement “within their own legal system and practice”); accord 
China – Measures, supra note 129, at XX (rejecting the United States’ claim that 
China’s numerical threshold for criminally prosecuting stockpiles of illicit copies 
fell short of its obligation under the TRIPS Agreement to pursue adequate 
enforcement measures against “commercial-scale counterfeiting and piracy”). 
 136. Conversely, countries should not hesitate to employ the full array of levers 
within their sovereign discretion to “minimize the negatives” in sectors where they 
do not anticipate IP rights serving their interests. 
 137. Or vice versa. See Jishnu Guha, Note, Time for India’s Intellectual 
Property Regime to Grow Up, 13 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 225, 241, 255 
(2005) (describing India’s selective-enforcement practices as sectorally targeted, 
with the government concentrating on software piracy while largely neglecting the 
entertainment industry). 
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enforcement initiatives.138 E-commerce sites offer their own platform 
of services with similar benefits.139 
Even modest investments in external capacity building can pay 
lasting dividends. The viability of domestic industries in a global 
marketplace often hinges on capturing economies of scale through 
exports.140 Yet the costs of developing transnational capabilities deter 
private firms from venturing overseas.141 Governments can help by 
providing technical and informational assistance to help domestic 
rightsholders navigate foreign IP systems more effectively and 
facilitate connections with overseas partners. Public-private 
initiatives to support transnational commercialization of IP can thus 
overcome what is otherwise a collective-action problem. 
The bottom line is that global IP regimes exist; they are here to 
stay. Developing countries should therefore think about how they can 
use them to their own advantage. They should act strategically and 
opportunistically to maximize gains by prioritizing capacity building 
in sectors that offer the most favorable prospects. Applying the 
preceding criteria, we can generally conclude that trademark offers a 
better deal than patent for most developing countries, with copyright 
perhaps a more ambiguous case. However, within the copyright 
realm, the case for encouraging homegrown creative industries is 
more robust and arguably under-appreciated.142 
 
 138. For example, the U.S. government provides a variety of enforcement 
services to IP rightsholders, including non-U.S. citizens. See NAT’L INTELLECTUAL 
PROP. RIGHTS COORDINATION CTR., http://www.iprcenter.gov/ (last visited Sept. 1, 
2012). Local prosecutors can also be enlisted on behalf of foreign content owners. 
See, e.g., Kareem Fahim, Pirated Films from Nigeria Are Seized in Brooklyn, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/05/nyregion/ 
05nollywood.html (describing how, in November 2010, local New York officials 
seized more than 10,000 counterfeit DVDs of Nigerian movies from nine stores in 
Brooklyn). 
 139. See Gurry, supra note 26, at 6 (describing YouTube’s content-filtering 
services to detect infringement and share revenues); YouTube Help, Other Legal 
Issues, YOUTUBE, http://support.google.com/youtube/bin/request.py?contact_ 
type=otherlegal (last visited Sept. 1, 2012) (providing YouTube users with a 
mechanism by which they can report potential copyright infringement). 
 140. See Beyond Culture vs. Commerce, supra note 76, at 126−27 (describing 
how scale economies achieved by export-oriented creative industries can support 
production of smaller-scale content aimed at domestic audiences). 
 141. Id. at 124. 
 142. The gap in trademark capacity in developing countries also appears less 
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The potential of creative industries has been widely recognized by 
policy-makers outside the realm of IP law, and a plethora of 
initiatives aim to encourage their development.143 Yet such initiatives 
typically neglect the IP dimensions. Conversely, IP policy-makers 
tend to regard creative industries as the province of Western media 
conglomerates and ignore prospects for homegrown development. 
Debates over IP & Development often center on patents and 
technology, to the exclusion of other subject matters.144 To the extent 
copyright issues are addressed, the focus tends to be on access-to-
knowledge concerns, which implicate subtractionist agendas.145 The 
positive potential for copyright law to serve as a driver of 
development is overlooked.146 
Such comparative neglect reflects a variety of biases that privilege 
“industrial” over “cultural rights” in global IP policy. Because 
copyright regimes do not require ex ante formalities, there is a 
misperception that copyright regimes can be self-executing. By 
contrast, patent and trademark regimes require more extensive 
administrative infrastructure, which is prioritized for capacity-
building investments.147 The subject matter of patents—technology—
 
acute, arguably making investments here less of a pressing need. See LEESTI & 
PENGELLY, supra note 21, at 32–33 (noting, in particular, the greater availability of 
legal expertise in the trademark field). 
 143. See infra notes 267–268. 
 144. See, e.g., infra note 270 and accompanying text. 
 145. See, e.g., Pedro Nicoletti Mizumaki & Ronaldo Lemos, Exceptions and 
Limitations to Copyright in Brazil: A Call for Reform, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE 
IN BRAZIL 67, 68–69 (Lea Shaver ed., 2008); Chon, supra note 134. 
 146. See, e.g., WIPO, Comm. on Dev. & Intellectual Prop. (CDIP), An External 
Review of WIPO Technical Assistance in the Area of Cooperation for 
Development, at vii, WIPO Doc. CDIP/8/INF/1 (Sept. 1, 2011) (by Carolyn Deere 
Birkbeck & Santiago Roca) [hereinafter External Review], available at 
http://www.wipo.int/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=182842 (criticizing 
WIPO’s focus on patents and trademarks instead of copyright). 
 147. See WIPO, CDIP, Management Response to the External Review of WIPO 
Technical Assistance in the Area of Cooperation for Development, 9th Sess., 29, 
WIPO Doc. CDIP/9/14 (Mar. 14, 2012) (explaining that WIPO spends more on 
“industrial rights” than copyright because of the cost of infrastructure). Moreover, 
the global crisis over access to medications arguably concentrated the minds of 
policy-makers on the patent sphere to the detriment of other IP priorities. See 
Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 756 (citing the conflict over access to 
AIDS medication as increasing awareness of the effect of patents on global health); 
cf. General Council Decision, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha 
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is also perceived as more important than copyrighted media, which 
are stereotyped as “frivolous” entertainment goods. Policy-makers 
often regard creative industries as more a cultural realm than the 
focus of commercial enterprise.148 Such viewpoints arguably reflect 
the lingering influence of “cultural imperialism” theories, which 
view local cultures as threatened by the hegemony that Western 
“culture industries” exert in global media markets. Such pessimistic 
outlooks ignore the effect of digital technologies in lowering entry 
barriers and enhancing the commercial viability of domestic 
content.149 
III. NOLLYWOOD: A CASE STUDY 
To appreciate the potential for digitally empowered creative 
industries to flourish in developing countries, Part III examines 
Nigeria’s video film industry—popularly known as Nollywood. The 
Nollywood case study serves not only to illustrate the developmental 
benefits of creative industries, but it also provides a test case to 
evaluate the tradeoffs between copyright protection and alternative 
policies. 
A. DEVELOPMENTAL PROMISE  
Nollywood illustrates both the potential and the predicament that 
many emerging creative industries face. A testament to the 
enterprising spirit of Nigerians overcoming countless obstacles, 
Nollywood has, in less than two decades, grown to become Africa’s 
dominant film industry and one of the world’s leading producers.150 
 
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr. 1 
(Sept. 1, 2003), available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ 
implem_para6_e.htm (calling for international capacity building to support 
regional patent organizations). 
 148. See, e.g., Frank J. Penna et al., The Africa Music Project, in POOR PEOPLE’S 
KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
95, 96 (J. Michael Finger & Philip Schuler eds., 2004) (discussing how the World 
Bank’s culture program drew criticism based on the perception that it “did not 
advance the Bank’s poverty reduction and economic development objective”); 
Beyond Culture vs. Commerce, supra note 76, at 90, 116 n.319 (describing 
European and Indian focuses on filmmaking as a cultural endeavor instead of a 
commercial product). 
 149. Digital Content Production, supra note 88, at 266. 
 150. Ramon Lobato, Creative Industries and Informal Economies: Lessons from 
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Its films are watched all across Africa, outselling Hollywood imports 
made with far higher budgets and more sophisticated production 
values.151 Nollywood’s success belies narratives of cultural 
imperialism that deem developing countries incapable of competing 
on a commercially significant scale. Moreover, as the world’s first 
fully digital film industry, Nollywood exemplifies the potential for 
developing countries to leapfrog outdated technologies.152 
Beyond these symbolic achievements, Nollywood also generates 
direct benefits to Nigeria. With annual revenues numbering in the 
hundreds of millions (in U.S. dollars), Nollywood has become 
Nigeria’s largest private employer.153 Perhaps more importantly, it 
serves as a “model of indigenous entrepreneurial achievement” in a 
country plagued by corruption and dysfunctional management.154  
The economic contribution of Nollywood, while substantial, 
arguably pales in comparison to its cultural significance. Africa has a 
deeply ingrained storytelling tradition, but it has long lacked the 
 
Nollywood, 13 INT’L J. OF CULTURAL STUDIES 337, 341 (2010). Obstacles to 
Nigerian enterprise include political and social instability, crime, corruption, 
failing infrastructure, frequent power outages, and dysfunctional legal institutions. 
Nigeria’s Prospects: A Man and a Morass, ECONOMIST, May 28, 2011, 
http://www.economist.com/node/18741606; Andrew Rice, A Scorsese in Lagos: 
The Making of Nigeria Film Industry, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 26, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/magazine/nollywood-movies.html 
?pagewanted=all. 
 151. Lobato, supra note 150, at 345, 348; see also Nollywood: Lights, Camera, 
Africa, ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 2010, http://www.economist.com/node/ 
17723124/print [hereinafter Nollywood] (describing how Nigerian films have 
become so popular that other African countries fear Nigerian cultural imperialism). 
 152. Folklore 2.0, supra note 60, at 23. 
 153. See Rice, supra note 150 (valuing the Nigerian film industry at $500 
million); Nollywood, supra note 151, at 85 (stating the film industry is the second-
largest employer after the government). The industry also generates indirect 
benefits such as road construction by film crews in rural villages. John C. McCall, 
Nollywood Confidential: The Unlikely Rise of Nigerian Video Film, 13 
TRANSITION 98, 101 (2004) [hereinafter Nollywood Confidential]. 
 154. John C. McCall, Madness, Money, and Movies: Watching a Nigerian 
Popular Video with the Guidance of a Native Doctor, 49 AFR. TODAY 79, 81, 92 
(2002) [hereinafter Madness, Money, and Movies] (noting that the Nigerian 
industry arose without government support and despite a generally investment-
starved economy); see also Nollywood Confidential, supra note 153, at 102 
(describing how Nollywood “has laid the groundwork for what might be called the 
Nigerian Dream—a genuine opportunity for legitimate financial success and even 
celebrity, open to just about anyone with talent and imagination”). 
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means to harness its creative energies through the media of popular 
culture. For the first time, African stories told by Africans can be 
shared by audiences across the continent.155 Nollywood films draw 
on West Africa’s rich folkloric heritage, imbuing new meaning and 
relevance to cultural traditions while projecting complex visions of 
African modernity.156  
Furthermore, whereas celluloid film production in Africa typically 
depended on patronage from government or foreign funders, 
Nollywood’s revenues flow directly from sales to consumers. As 
such, the industry enjoys an independent stature to poke fun at 
establishment figures via populist works of entertainment.157 Despite 
its commercial orientation, Nollywood films routinely explore 
provocative topics that expand the boundaries of public debate.158 
Moreover, far from advancing a single monolithic industry 
viewpoint, Nollywood’s decentralized structure ensures that a 
multiplicity of perspectives compete for consumer patronage. 
Whereas celluloid filmmaking imposed prohibitive barriers to entry, 
digital technology has not only made domestic filmmaking 
economically viable, it has greatly democratized access.159 
 
 155. Brian Larkin, Itineraries of Indian Cinema: African Videos, Bollywood, 
and Global Media, in MULTICULTURALISM, POSTCOLONIALITY, AND 
TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA 170, 180 (Ella Shohat & Robert Stam eds., 2004) (noting 
that, previously, “African cinema” referred to films produced in Africa but “more 
readily available in festivals in London, Paris, and New York, than they are in 
Abidjan, Lagos, or Mombasa”); Nollywood Confidential, supra note 153, at 109 
(stating that Nigerian films capture the “hopes and fears” of modern African 
people); Jonathan Haynes, Introduction to NIGERIAN VIDEO FILMS 4 (Jonathan 
Haynes ed., 2000) (arguing that Nigerian films are an expression of the 
contemporary culture and imagination of Africa’s largest nation). 
 156. Folklore 2.0, supra note 60, at 24, 25, 27. 
 157. John C. McCall, Juju and Justice at the Movies: Vigilantes in Nigerian 
Popular Videos, 47 AFR. STUD. REV. 51, 55 (2004) (describing films that depict 
Nigerian leaders as conspiring against members of the community). 
 158. Nollywood films address everything from polygamy, prostitution, teenage 
pregnancy, and AIDS to crime, drugs, police corruption, and coup d’états in an 
energetic, no-holds-barred fashion. Nigerian directors “even manage to use 
religion to make people laugh, in a country where fanaticism and inter-
denominational confrontations are rife.” Pierre Barrot, Audacity, Scandal & 
Censorship, in NOLLYWOOD: THE VIDEO PHENOMENON IN NIGERIA 43, 44 (Pierre 
Barrot ed., Lynn Taylor trans., 2008) [hereinafter Audacity, Scandal & 
Censorship]. 
 159. Tunde Kelani, Spielberg & I: The Digital Revolution, in NOLLYWOOD: THE 
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Nollywood produces films in multiple languages and geographic 
locales. “Virtually anyone who can rent the equipment . . . can 
become a Nollywood producer.”160 Digital distribution affords a low-
cost means to bypass government censors. Given the tight control 
over public media hitherto exercised by the African state, 
Nollywood’s contribution to public discourse in Africa has been 
significant and virtually unprecedented.161 
While the benefits of such creative enterprise are manifold, its 
commercial prospects are less rosy. Nollywood’s growth remains 
hampered by piracy.162 Without exclusive control over the 
distribution of such copies, producers are forced to recoup their 
investments during the brief window during which they can beat 
pirates to market.163 Such restricted revenues impose a straightjacket 
on artistic ambitions and investment.164  
To be clear, Nollywood’s “piracy problem” has nothing to do with 
 
VIDEO PHENOMENON IN NIGERIA 90, 90–91 (Pierre Barrot ed., Lynn Taylor trans., 
2008) (describing the benefits of digital film technologies that enable the 
production of high-quality films with low-cost equipment). 
 160. John C. McCall, The Pan-Africanism We Have: Nollywood’s Invention of 
Africa, 5 FILM INT’L 92, 96 (2007). A significant number of Nollywood directors 
and producers are women, who were excluded from traditional filmmaking. 
Madness, Money, and Movies, supra note 154, at 81 (2002). 
 161. Commentators have hailed the industry as unveiling a new era in 
democratic accountability. See, e.g., Audacity, Scandal & Censorship, supra note 
158, at 44, 46 (describing the license for openly discussing religion and 
government corruption in Nollywood films that is unmatched in other media); 
Brian Larkin, Hausa Dramas and the Rise of Video Culture in Nigeria, in 
NIGERIAN VIDEO FILMS 209, 211 (Jonathan Haynes ed., 2000) (same); Foluke 
Ogunleye, Preface to AFRICAN VIDEO FILM TODAY ix, x (Foluke Ogunleye ed., 
2003) (arguing that the rise in political awareness brought by Nigerian films will 
awaken and empower the Nigerian people). 
 162. The World Bank estimates that Nollywood loses $1 billion in revenue 
annually to piracy. World Bank, Integrated Safeguards Datasheet, at 6, Report No. 
AC5285 (May 19, 2010), available at http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/ 
en/2010/05/12283885/nigeria-nigeria-growth-employment-states-nigeria-growth-
employment-states-project. 
 163. Nollywood, supra note 151 (stating that filmmakers have a two-week 
“mating season” before their products become pirated commodities). 
 164. See Patrick J. Ebewo, The Emerging Video Film Industry in Nigeria: 
Challenges and Prospects, 59 J. FILM & VIDEO 46, 54 (2007) (arguing that piracy 
might grind the industry to a halt because it robs producers and artists of their 
financial incentive). 
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peer-to-peer file sharing or Internet mash-ups.165 It involves 
commercial enterprises whose verbatim, wholesale copying and 
distribution on an industrial scale directly competes with and 
supplants filmmakers’ own sales in their primary market.166 This is 
the core market failure that copyright law was designed to remedy. 
Addressing it need not entail advancing any “maximalist” agenda 
beyond adherence to traditional copyright norms, nor does it pose 
undue risks to freedom of expression. And unlike pharmaceuticals or 
educational textbooks, access to movies for entertainment hardly 
presents a human rights concern. 
Even a modest increase in copyright enforcement would yield 
palpable benefits. Because filmmakers reap only a fraction of the 
total revenue that their movies generate, the industry suffers from 
chronic underinvestment. Assembly-line productions with formulaic 
scripts, wooden acting, and crude production values are the 
predictable result of the skinflint budgets and breakneck schedules 
on which Nollywood operates.167 
Lack of copyright protection also introduces perverse incentives. 
Filmmakers are forced to pursue a churn strategy that rushes new 
videos to market weekly to beat the pirates.168 Such high-volume, 
low-revenue production restricts the creative ambition that could be 
invested in developing any single project. Moreover, without 
enforceable copyrights in their work, filmmakers cannot offer 
collateral to obtain financing. Instead, they must rely on informal 
short-term lenders at punitive interest rates—reinforcing the “rush to 
market” mentality that fosters slap-dash productions.169  
 
 165. File sharing was also not the impetus for Nigerian musicians to launch a 
hunger strike in 2009 protesting unauthorized commercial exploitation of their 
works. See infra notes 177–178 and accompanying text. 
 166. See Will Connors, Nollywood Babylon, WALL ST. J., May 22, 2009, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203771904574177472683696390
.html. 
 167. See Jonathan Haynes & Onookome Okome, Evolving Popular Media: 
Nigerian Video Films, in NIGERIAN VIDEO FILMS 51, 57 (Jonathan Haynes ed., 
2000). 
 168. See Pierre Barrot, The Italians of Africa, in NOLLYWOOD: THE VIDEO 
PHENOMENON IN NIGERIA 12, 15 (Pierre Barrot ed., Lynn Taylor trans., 2008) 
(linking the “draconian schedule for shooting” pursued by Nollywood filmmakers 
to the need to recoup profits quickly before pirates can divert revenues). 
 169. See Ebewo, supra note 164, at 52 (explaining that entrepreneurs with no 
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Lack of clear ownership rights breeds distrust at all levels of the 
industry. Bickering between producers and distributors is 
legendary.170 Fear of script piracy has even led some directors to 
withhold scripts from their actors; instead, actors are only given their 
lines for individual scenes as they are shot.171 Copyright failures 
therefore increase industry transaction costs and hamper creativity.172 
If we accept that intellectual property should serve “human values,” 
we must reckon with these non-economic costs of piracy as well. Yet 
existing discourse on intellectual property and development seldom 
acknowledges such drawbacks. Instead, many commentators assume 
that intellectual property rights represent a losing proposition for 
developing countries and rarely look past this global assessment.  
Nor is the problem purely a matter of domestic concern. 
Distribution of Nollywood videos outside Nigeria is predominantly 
unauthorized, with very little revenue flowing to content 
producers.173 Unauthorized distribution of Nollywood films occurs 
even in developed-country markets that have functioning copyright 
 
training in film dictate a shooting schedule that creates films in a “fast-food-
style”); see also Paul Salopek, Nigeria Goes Hollywood, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 27, 
2005, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2005-11-27/news/0511270301_1_video-
stores-south-africa-movie-crew (describing the amateur nature of many Nigerian 
film productions). 
 170. Pierre Barrot, Selling Like Hot Cake: Box Office & Statistics, in 
NOLLYWOOD: THE VIDEO PHENOMENON IN NIGERIA 32, 34–36 (Pierre Barrot ed., 
Lynn Taylor trans., 2008) (stating that distributors and producers often cheat each 
other out of profits or accuse the other of doing so). 
 171. See Haynes, supra note 155, at 57 (arguing that lack of opportunity for 
actors to rehearse leads to the shallow characterizations prevalent in Nigerian 
films). 
 172. See WIPO, Information Meeting on Intellectual Property Financing: WIPO 
Information Paper on Intellectual Property Financing, 75–76, Doc. 
WIPO/IP/FIN/GE/09/07 (Oct. 9, 2009), available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/ 
mdocs/copyright/en/wipo_ip_fin_ge_09/wipo_ip_fin_ge_09_7-main1.pdf 
[hereinafter WIPO Information Paper] (explaining how a lack of copyright 
formalities inhibits access to formal finance). See generally Paul J. Heald, A 
Transactions Cost Theory of Patent Law, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 473, 474–77 (2005) 
(arguing, in a patent context, that lowered transaction costs provide an alternative 
justification for IP protection beyond traditional incentive theories). 
 173. See, e.g., Madu Chikwendu, Inside the Industry, WIPO MAG., June 2007, at 
9 (explaining that piracy of Nigerian films outside the country includes 
unauthorized broadcasts on television and Internet piracy). 
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regimes.174 As a result, Nollywood producers have largely failed to 
translate the enthusiastic demand for their products among wealthy 
African diasporal communities into tangible revenues.175 
As an export industry, Nollywood’s interest in cross-border 
copyright enforcement is obvious. Less intuitive is the interest that 
countries that are recipients of pirated content have in blocking such 
unauthorized distribution. Yet imported copies of pirated content 
undercut the market for legitimate sales by domestic producers. 
Other emerging African film industries have complained that pirated 
Nollywood films represent a form of unfair competition.176  
B. COPYRIGHT VS. ALTERNATIVES POLICIES 
Is copyright law the solution to such complaints? As an industry, 
Nollywood is virtually unanimous in clamoring for increased 
protection. Musicians across Africa have voiced their agreement, 
taking to the streets to protest piracy.177 But perhaps these artists and 
entrepreneurs are misguided, clinging to an outdated paradigm out of 
ignorance.178 In Western academic and policy circles, the merits of 
relying on the copyright system to underwrite Africa’s emerging 
creative industries remains a subject of debate. 
 
 174. See Stevina Evuleocha, Nollywood and the Home Video Revolution: 
Implications for Marketing Videofilm in Africa, 3 INT’L J. EMERGING MARKETS 
407, 409 (2008). 
 175. DE BEER & OGUAMANAM, supra note 43, at 22 (asserting that illicit 
copying of Nollywood films in wealthy developed markets may constitute the 
majority of the industry’s losses to piracy). 
 176. Nollywood, supra note 151 (describing how other countries have instituted 
protectionist measures and how Congo tried to ban Nigerian films). Such 
complaints accord with the theoretical point made above about piracy of foreign 
works as a form of unfair competition disadvantaging domestic authors. See supra 
note 173 and accompanying text. 
 177. Schultz & Gelder, supra note 50, at 79 (recounting protests by African 
musicians focused failures of their legal systems that allow rampant piracy, 
corruption, and non-collection or diversion of royalties). Nigerian musicians in 
2009 went on hunger strike, underscoring the threat to livelihoods that piracy 
poses. Charles Okogene, Nigeria: Musicians Begin Hunger Strike Tuesday, ALL 
AFR. (Aug. 24, 2009), allafrica.com/stories/printable/200908240174.html. 
 178. See, e.g., A Hunger Strike Isn’t a New Business Model and It Won’t Stop 
File Sharing, TECHDIRT (July 14, 2012, 1:32 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/ 
articles/20090827/0302056018.shtml (faulting the failure of musicians to adopt a 
new business model). 
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Some commentators observe that piracy has also benefited 
Nollywood by supplying a ready-made distribution network that has 
helped the industry unlock markets.179 True, but a motion picture 
industry cannot survive solely on the “brand recognition” that such 
unauthorized distribution generates. Unless producers can monetize 
their creative investments more directly, artists will not get paid. 
Without mechanisms to share the proceeds from pirate distribution, 
Nollywood is denied the revenues needed to develop, and it remains 
trapped in a low-rent prison of grade “C” filmmaking.180 
Other critics accuse copyright law of inhibiting diversity by 
conferring excess market power to industry conglomerates.181 There 
is some merit to these claims. The diversity of Nollywood’s output 
may partly reflect weak copyright norms that inhibit studios from 
investing in blockbuster productions. However, Nollywood’s current 
structure lies so far to the other end of this spectrum that a modest 
tradeoff of quantity for quality seems more than tolerable.182 
Nigeria’s situation in this regard is hardly unusual among developing 
countries.183  
Admittedly, copyright law is not the only policy tool that could 
 
 179. See, e.g., Kaitlin Mara, Open Business Systems Fill Gap in Mainstream 
Entertainment Industry, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Sept. 12, 2008, 11:35 AM), 
www.ip-watch.org/2008/09/12/open-business-systems-fill-gap-in-mainstream-
entertainment-industry (recounting the view that piracy “created an audience” and 
desire for more Nigerian films). 
 180. See Connors, supra note 166. 
 181. See Guy Pessach, Copyright Law as a Silencing Restriction on 
Noninfringing Materials: Unveiling the Scope of Copyright’s Diversity 
Externalities, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1067, 1092–95 (2003) (arguing that excessive 
copyright protection encourages forms of cultural commodification that decrease 
the “cultural space” left for smaller producers). 
 182. See Mark Schultz, The Nigerian Film Industry and Lessons Regarding 
Cultural Diversity from the Home-Market Effects Model of International Trade in 
Films, in TRANSNATIONAL CULTURE IN THE INTERNET AGE 251–52 (Sean A. Pager 
& Adam Candeub eds., forthcoming 2012). 
 183. See, e.g., Floyd Whaley, New Ambitions in Philippine Film Business, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 8, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/08/business/global/new-
ambitions-in-philippine-film-business.html?pagewanted=all (stating that, in the 
Philippines, “rampant piracy” has undercut investment in the local film industry, 
“as in many other developing Asian countries,” and describing how the resulting 
climate of depressed revenues and increased risk inhibit filmmakers from taking 
chances on innovative productions). 
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underwrite such creative investments. IP skeptics often characterize 
copyright as reflecting an outdated scarcity paradigm now obsolete 
in the digital era. The Washington Declaration envisions a future in 
which the “existing intellectual property system” gives way to “a 
broader mix of models” based on indirect rewards, public funding, 
and disintermediarized distribution.184 Other commentators proffer 
equally enticing visions of a future powered by web 2.0 platforms, 
long-tail economics, flat-rate licenses, and alternative revenues that 
make creative content freely available to all.185 Experimentation is 
welcome and should be encouraged. However, these alternative 
models will take time to develop and refine. In the short-to-medium 
term, Nollywood—and other emerging creative industries like it—
would arguably be better served by measures to make the ostensibly 
“existing” copyright system actually function in the manner 
intended. 
Furthermore, there are serious questions both as to viability and 
desirability of many alternative models. While copyright is a proven 
model subject to well-known tradeoffs, the drawbacks of many of the 
alternatives remain inadequately explored. For example, some argue 
that IP-based businesses should rely on performance revenues, 
treating creativity as a service, rather than a product.186 Performance 
models generally offer a more viable option for music than film 
because production costs are lower and the experience can be more 
 
 184. Washington Declaration, supra note 17, at 4. 
 185. See CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS 
SELLING LESS OF MORE 88–89 (2006) (describing how economies of scope allow 
e-commerce vendors to efficiently cater to niche content markets); YOCHAI 
BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 15 (2006) (hailing networked technology as 
enabling the rebirth of a digital “folk culture”); WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES 
TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 202–58 
(2004) (reimagining the copyright system as a government-run collective license 
regime); CHRIS ANDERSON, FREE: THE FUTURE OF A RADICAL PRICE 20–22 (2009) 
(contending that web 2.0 platforms support the provision of free content funded by 
innovative business models that tap alternative revenue sources). 
 186. See Pedro Nicoletti Mizukami & Ronaldo Lemos, From Free Software to 
Free Culture: The Emergence of Open Business, in ACCESS TO KNOWLEDGE IN 
BRAZIL 25, 40 (Lea Shaver ed., 2008) (describing how Brazil’s tecnobrega music 
genre makes its revenue from live concerts and interactive experiences); Mark F. 
Schultz, Live Performance, Copyright, and the Future of the Music Business, 43 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 685, 696–701 (2009) [hereinafter Live Performance] (critiquing the 
concert revenue model). 
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spontaneous and interactive. Films designed for theatrical exhibition 
require much higher production values than typical Nollywood 
productions. While Nollywood has attempted recently to move in 
this direction, the market for such films remains unproven.187  
Furthermore, even in the music business, concert revenues are 
unlikely to offset lost sales of copyrighted media.188 For emerging 
creative industries such as Nollywood, sales of copyrighted media 
remain the most viable means to reach widely dispersed audiences 
across Africa and African diaspora communities.189 By contrast, 
theatrical exhibitions offer a poor substitute. Rural populations in 
developing countries often lack access to conventional cinema. Even 
in urban settings, potential revenues from theatrical exhibition can be 
limited.190 Moreover, women are often excluded from such public 
 
 187. Schultz, supra note 182, at 258. Moreover, bootleg taping at film premiers 
exposes filmmakers to a new avenue for piracy that could undermine subsequent 
sales of recorded media. Lack of copyright enforcement also means Nollywood 
largely forgoes revenues from licensing TV broadcast rights. See Chikwendu, 
supra note 173, at 9 (stating that other African countries broadcast pirated DVDs 
without paying for the rights). 
 188. See Live Performance, supra note 186, at 722, 762 (describing how the 
practical limits of scarcity and timing limit potential concert revenues). Nor is it 
clear that a performance model works for all music: not all composers are 
performers; not all performers want to tour; not all artists can attract sufficient 
concertgoers in a single location. Id. at 755, 759–60. 
 189. See Nollywood Confidential, supra note 153, at 98 (explaining 
impediments to film distribution in Africa); Olivier Bartlet, Is the Nigerian Model 
Fit for Export?, in NOLLYWOOD: THE VIDEO PHENOMENON IN NIGERIA 121, 125 
(Pierre Barrot ed., Lynn Taylor trans., 2008) (estimating turnover generated by 
exports of Nollywood videos at $950,000); Evuleocha, supra note 174, at 410–11 
(relating the popularity of Nigerian films among African migrants overseas). The 
advent of mobile Internet networks in Africa will open up new distribution 
channels. See Digital Revolution, supra note 106 (explaining how expansion of 
mobile Internet in Africa has quadrupled data speeds and lowered cost by ninety 
percent, preparing the market for growth in online entertainment using products 
such as tablet computers). But technological capacity alone is useless unless 
content producers benefit. That cellular phone operators in Nigeria continue to 
rebuff demands to share revenues with musicians whose work is sold as ringtones 
does not bode well in this regard. 
 190. Many developing countries face a declining stock of poorly maintained 
cinemas, as home-viewing drains revenues. In theory, small-scale video parlors 
could offer a solution, but to reap the benefits, rightsholders would need the means 
to enforce performance rights. Schultz, supra note 182, at 261. 
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spaces, particularly in conservative Muslim regions.191  
Other alternatives to IP rights present their own drawbacks. For 
example, the Washington Declaration’s call for “systems of indirect 
rewards, such as levies on media, equipment, or usage,”192 assumes 
the existence of functioning, transparent institutions to operate 
them—an assumption implicitly called into question by the 
Declaration’s own call for greater oversight of collective rights 
organizations (“CROs”) that immediately follows.193 African CROs, 
in particular, have a far-from-inspiring track record. Their record of 
inefficiency and cronyism and their unwillingness to adapt to modern 
technologies casts doubt on the efficacy by which newfangled levies 
and/or flat-rate licenses could be implemented.194 
Similarly, the Declaration’s call for public funding for “small-
market audiovisual, musical and artistic culture”195 raises concerns 
over the government bureaucracies and ideological biases associated 
with public patronage.196 The Washington Declaration wisely limits 
its focus to “types of production deemed socially valuable and 
 
 191. Brian Larkin, House Dramas and the Rise of Video Culture in Nigeria, in 
MULTICULTURALISM, POSTCOLONIALITY, AND TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA 209, 226–
27 (Ella Shohat & Robert Stam eds., 2004) (describing how television and video 
“revolutionized” the participation of women in the Nigerian public sphere by 
bringing media to the home). 
 192. Washington Declaration, supra note 17, at 4. 
 193. Id. (calling for “greater transparency, accountability, internal democracy 
and public oversight on the part of collective rights management organizations”). 
 194. See Schultz & van Gelder, supra note 50, at 131–32 (contending that 
African musicians are unable to reap the benefits of their copyrights due to grossly 
inefficient or corrupt CROs). Nor is Africa atypical in this regard. See Ariel Katz, 
Copyright Collectives: Good Solution but for Which Problem?, in WORKING 
WITHIN THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 395, 411–15 
(Rochelle C. Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2010) (debunking the notion that CROs offer an 
efficient model by which to commercially exploit creative content); Sibylle E. 
Schlatter, Copyright Collecting Societies in Developing Countries: Possibilities 
and Dangers, in NEW FRONTIERS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 53, 56–60 
(Christopher Heath & Anselm Kamperman Sanders eds., 2005) (documenting the 
failures of governance and dystopian track record of CROs in the developing 
world). 
 195. Washington Declaration, supra note 17, at 4. 
 196. See Beyond Culture vs. Commerce, supra note 76, at 85–86 (attributing the 
decline of European cinema, in part, to bureaucratic selection pressures exerted by 
state patronage regimes). 
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systemically under-provisioned by the market.”197 Yet, for many 
developing countries, what is “under-provisioned” is locally 
produced content of any kind. Rather than relying on state patronage 
to fill the gap, we should look to encourage independent voices.198 
Whereas state support in Africa has often come at a price of heavy 
censorship,199 digital technologies have opened the door to 
alternative sources of homegrown expression. Nollywood’s unique 
style of filmmaking has attracted widespread imitation, with 
fledgling video film industries popping up across the African 
continent.200 Digital creativity has revitalized other media as well, 
 
 197. Washington Declaration, supra note 17, at 4. 
 198. A similar critique applies to suggestions that state-funded innovation would 
be preferable to patent monopolies. We should be wary of empowering 
government bureaucrats to usurp control at the expense of markets. Governments 
have a terrible track record of picking winners, and public funding is often 
inefficient, susceptible to fads and political influence, and plagued by cronyism (if 
not outright corruption). See, e.g., From Brawn to Brain: If China Is to Excel at 
Innovation, the State Must Give Entrepreneurs More Freedom, ECONOMIST, Mar. 
10, 2012 (arguing that state-controlled investments in product innovation have not 
been successful); Steven Mufson, Before Solyndra, A Long History of Failed 
Government Energy Projects, WASH. POST (Nov. 13, 2011), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/before-solyndra-a-long-history-of-
failed-government-energy-projects/2011/10/25/gIQA1xG0CN_story.html (linking 
failures in U.S. federal government investment in new energy technologies to a 
larger pattern of misallocated public funding). 
 199. See Audacity, Scandal & Censorship, supra note 158, at 44–46; Haynes, 
supra note 155, at 8. Even in the absence of affirmative censorship, state patronage 
can supplant private markets, introduce biases toward elite culture, or be 
vulnerable to corruption. See Beyond Culture vs. Commerce, supra note 76, at 78–
90 (describing the deterioration of the European film industry through a “self-
indulgent” focus on state-subsidized, art-house cinema at the expense of 
commercial projects). 
 200. See, e.g., Helena Barnard & Krista Tuomi, How Demand Sophistication 
(De-)limits Economic Upgrading: Comparing the Film Industries of South Africa 
and Nigeria, 15 INDUSTRY & INNOVATION 647, 660 (2008) (describing how 
Uganda’s “Ugowood” and Kenya’s “Riverwood” show that the Nigerian model 
can operate in smaller African countries); Foluke Ogunleye, Video Film in Ghana: 
An Overview, in AFRICAN VIDEO TODAY 1, 3–6 (Foluke Ogunleye ed., 2003) 
(discussing the rise of video movies in Ghana and exploring parallels with the 
Nigerian industry); Nollywood, supra note 151, at 88 (stating “South African, 
Tanzania, and Cameroon are now producing hundreds of films a year”). That such 
industries can flourish even in much smaller domestic markets than Nigeria 
testifies to the extent of digital technologies’ democratizing potential. Kenya’s 
“Riverwood,” in particular, is said to produce more than 1,000 films per year and 
“is now beating Nigeria at its own award ceremonies.” Nollywood, supra note 151; 
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from Ugandan hip-hop to Senegalese animation.201 A more effective 
copyright system would go a long way toward sustaining and 
encouraging such creative upstarts. In this manner, copyright 
functions to sustain democratic discourse independent of state 
funding.202  
Nor does advertising offer much of a panacea. While Nollywood 
producers increasingly rely on private sponsorship—a revenue 
model often touted as an alternative to intellectual property rights—
such sponsorships come with strings attached.203 Marketers are 
unwilling to put up significant funds unless they gain substantial 
creative control over content, demanding blatant product placements 
that effectively transform movies into infomercials for everything 
from beer to Christianity to AIDS prevention to political 
campaigns.204 Far from enabling democratized expression, private 
 
see also Riverwood: Kenyan Super-Fast, Super-Cheap Filmmaking, NOWPUBLIC 
(Dec. 26, 2008, 12:38 PM), http://www.nowpublic.com/world/riverwood-kenyan-
super-fast-super-cheap-filmmaking (examining the rise of Kenya’s $13 million 
“Riverwood,” named after a bustling creative hub in Nairobi, and its appeal as 
“reflecting the Kenyan way of life and entertaining Kenyans”). 
 201. See, e.g., Hip-Hop in Uganda: The Dance in the Night-time, ECONOMIST, 
Feb. 26, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/18226575 (discussing the 
popularity of hip-hop dance in Uganda underwritten by digital media); Putting 
Africa on the Animation Map: The Story of Pictoon, Senegal, WIPO MAG., Sept. 
2005, at 10 (relating the global success of homegrown African cartoon series made 
using digital production techniques); Magic Cellar, MORULA PICTURES, 
http://www.morula.co.za/productions_magic_cellar.html (last visited Aug. 11, 
2012) (describing a South African 3D cartoon series based on African folktales 
that has won twenty-nine international awards since 2006). Such developments are 
not limited to Africa. See Kimberly Christen, Balancing Act: The Creation and 
Circulation of Indigenous Knowledge and Culture Inside and Outside the Legal 
Frame, in TRANSNATIONAL CULTURE IN THE INTERNET AGE (Sean A. Pager & 
Adam Candeub eds., forthcoming 2012) (describing the use of digital media by 
indigenous groups in Australia and North America); Digital Content Production, 
supra note 88 (explaining how Brazil’s Culture Points initiative has empowered 
diverse creative expression including video filmmaking by Amazonian Indians). 
 202. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles 
in the Global Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 228–30 (1998) (describing how the 
copyright system promotes democratic self-governance by ensuring independent 
outlets for public expression insulated from government control). 
 203. Nigeria’s Film Industry: Nollywood Dreams, ECONOMIST, July 27, 2006, 
http://www.economist.com/node/7226009. 
 204. See Gabriel A. Oyewo, The Yoruba Video Film: Cinematic Language and 
the Socio-Aesthetic Ideal, in AFRICAN VIDEO TODAY 141, 147 (Foluke Ogunleye 
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patronage effectively substitutes a form of private speech control for 
public censorship.205  
Focusing solely on economic losses to piracy, therefore, may 
understate the true harm to the cultural and informational ecologies 
that copyright-based industries sustain: a functioning copyright 
system that ensures an outlet for independent voices. This, too, 
represents a societal value that must be tallied in the positive ledger 
when accounting for the public interest in upholding intellectual 
property rights. Enforcing copyrights may “commandeer” public 
resources, but the benefits generated are not solely private. 
While “free culture” models offer alternative means to secure 
some of these benefits, their potential remains unproven and subject 
to drawbacks. It would thus be foolish to presumptively reject 
copyright as a policy tool. Suggestions to the contrary from Northern 
digerati often reflect fundamental misconceptions about creative 
industries in developing countries. Notwithstanding its digital 
pedigree, Nollywood remains wedded to a twentieth-century 
business model based on sales of creative content embodied in 
physical copies. Alternative distribution models remain limited for 
the foreseeable future.206 Cyber-libertarian dogmas about embracing 
file sharing or monetizing YouTube mash-ups are beside the point.  
 
ed., 2003) (recounting Nigerian politicians’ use of propaganda-filled films to 
influence the electorate); Evuleocha, supra note 174, at 410 (describing a program 
where the BBC World Service Trust funded sixteen films designed to focus public 
attention on issues such as the benefits of condom use and discrimination against 
people living with HIV/AIDS). 
 205. Such private censorship exposes the fallacy of web 2.0 assumptions that 
advertising is a benign substitute for intellectual property. Cf. Ivan Reidel, The 
FCC’s Anti-Payola Enforcement: A Policy at War with Itself, HARVARD UNIV. 
(John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus. Fellows’ Discussion Paper Ser. No. 36, 
2010), at 2–8 (arguing that reliance on advertising reduces audience welfare by 
inducing radio stations to select songs that facilitate the sale of products to 
particular demographics but which correlate weakly with audience preferences). 
Similarly, concerns about privacy dog e-commerce business models based on 
harvesting personal data for marketing purposes. See Jaron Lanier, The False 
Ideals of the Web, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/ 
19/opinion/sopa-boycotts-and-the-false-ideals-of-the-web.html (asserting that 
pursuit of advertising encourages web companies to engage in practices contrary to 
consumer welfare). 
 206. Internet access in Africa is growing, but it remains far from mainstream, 
with bandwidth capacity limited. See Digital Revolution, supra note 106. 
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Nor should modest investments in strengthening the copyright 
system be seen as posing an obstacle to alternative models. Making 
copyright more “open” or fairer to authors need not mean 
abandoning enforcement against commercial piracy. Rather, content 
producers should retain the option to experiment with content 
distribution under a variety of different licensing models. Copyright 
should be part of the mix. 
Copyright incentives only function, however, when content 
producers are ensured adequate enforcement mechanisms.207 And 
enforcement is only one of the mechanisms required for a fully 
functioning copyright system; others include registration, licensing, 
and clearance. In many developing countries, such mechanisms 
remain underdeveloped, if they exist at all. Part IV examines the 
scope for capacity building to tackle such deficiencies.  
IV. BUILDING CAPACITY FOR CREATIVE 
DEVELOPMENT 
Building on the Nigerian example, this part first examines 
measures that could be implemented at the level of national policy 
and then shifts focus to the international dimension of capacity 
building. 
A. NATIONAL POLICY 
The Nigerian government has come to recognize the importance of 
copyright to Nollywood’s fortune and has made some efforts to 
invest in capacity building.208 However, its recent efforts to crack 
down on copyright piracy have yielded mixed results.209 Nigeria’s 
 
 207. Schultz & van Gelder, supra note 50, at 91 (arguing that the ability to 
enforce intellectual property rights laws is a “key factor[]” in determining whether 
IP rights “actually serve to encourage development”). 
 208. See DE BEER & OGUAMANAM, supra note 43, at 23 (describing Nigerian 
enforcement campaigns and education initiatives to reduce piracy). 
 209. See Sylvie Castonguay, STRAP and CLAMP: Nigeria Copyright 
Commission in Action, WIPO MAG., Sept. 2008, at 21 (relating that the first two 
years of a Nigerian anti-piracy initiative resulted in the seizure of more than eight 
million pirated works and fifteen court cases). But see Benjamin Njoku, Nigeria: 
NCC Wants Kelani’s N1.7 Million to Raid Alaba Pirates, ALL AFR. (July 10, 
2010), http://allafrica.com/stories/201007160203.html (describing the demand that 
a film director pay an exorbitant fee before the government would act to enforce 
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weak state institutions and lack of rule-of-law culture limit the extent 
to which wholesale reforms can be realized. A good place to start 
would be focusing on providing quick remedies in clear-cut cases of 
commercial-scale piracy through streamlined judicial procedures and 
specially trained and dedicated staff.210 
Given the pan-African distribution of Nollywood movies, Nigerian 
efforts to strengthen the copyright system need to extend beyond 
Nigeria’s borders. Investments in regional capacity could yield 
tangible benefits. Enforcement is not the only issue. Proving 
ownership poses a key obstacle to exploiting copyrights in Africa as 
well. The informal manner in which Nollywood operates makes it 
difficult to determine who has authorization to distribute films or, in 
many cases, even who is the copyright owner.211 This problem 
underscores the need for a more effective system of copyright 
registry, preferably operating on a regional basis.212 Recent efforts to 
develop the digital capabilities of the West African Copyright 
Network represent a promising first step.213 However, there remains 
substantial scope to further enhance regional cooperation.214   
 
his copyright). 
 210. Cf. Randy Berholtz et al., Improving Patent Adjudication: An Updated and 
Revised Survey of Practitioners’ Experience and Opinions, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 223, 239 (2010) (describing various international models of specialized IP 
courts or judges). 
 211. See Audacity, Scandal & Censorship, supra note 158, at 15 (providing 
examples of people remaking other directors’ films or marketing their films under 
the names of competitors). 
 212. WIPO Information Paper, supra note 172, at 76 (arguing that linking 
copyright registration “to an IP rights database would greatly facilitate third-party 
film financing”). The Washington Declaration’s suggestion in this regard is 
therefore extremely well taken. Cf. Washington Declaration, supra note 17, at 4 
(“Encourage the establishment of publicly accessible systems of rights 
management information which ensure that authors and artists can be identified.”). 
That this suggestion was motivated by concerns for user access rather than for 
rightsholders only goes to show that “negative” and “positive” agendas for IP law 
need not conflict. 
 213. WIPO, WIPO Director General Announces Rights Registry Project for 
West African States, WIPO Doc. PR/2011/691 (June 8, 2011), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2011/article_0017.html (reporting 
development of a rights registry program for West African states to streamline 
administrative costs). 
 214. The West African Copyright Network focuses narrowly on facilitating 
allocation of royalties between member state music CROs. It does not address 
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Perhaps the greatest gains in regional cooperation have been 
informal agreements forged between Nollywood “marketers” and 
similar distribution networks in neighboring countries.215 Such 
informal cooperation continues Nollywood’s pattern of co-opting 
pirate networks to distribute locally produced goods. As a general 
strategy, there is much to commend in co-opting pirate networks, and 
it has been successfully applied in other contexts.216 At the same 
time, where distribution remains entirely consigned to informal “grey 
market” networks, the inability to tap into conventional market 
structures of financing and distribution severely limits the potential 
for future growth.217  
Such constraints help to explain the failure of Nollywood and 
other emerging creative industries to exploit diaspora markets, 
despite the presence of comparatively wealthy expatriate populations 
eager to maintain ties to their ancestral homeland. While the United 
States and Europe have well-established mechanisms for IP 
enforcement, the transaction costs of long-distance enforcement 
actions—both informational and legal—often deter content 
producers from developing countries from pursuing valid claims.218 
 
other copyrighted media. Id. It is worth noting that the main global CRO focused 
on audiovisual works, AGICOA, does not appear to have any African members. 
See Members, AGICOA, http://www.agicoa.org/english/about/members.html (last 
visited Sept. 1, 2012) (showing no African members). The other regional IP 
organizations in Africa, ARIPO and OAPI, focus on patent and trademark rights, 
and Nigeria is not even a member of either. See generally Zion H. Park, What the 
PCT Can Learn from Two African Systems, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 
693, 702–08 (2007) (comparing one system granting individual national patents 
with another where “a single patent law is applied to all . . . member nations”). 
 215. See Lobato, supra note 150, at 340–41 (explaining that the success of 
cooperative distribution in neighboring countries is “based on a complex balance 
of credit and trust”). 
 216. See Karaganis, supra note 27, at 64–65 (noting that industries in South 
Africa, Brazil, India, Russia, and Bolivia have all looked to the superior 
distribution methods of informal markets); Lobato, supra note 150, at 347 (noting 
that parallels exist between Nollywood and early Hollywood, as both share 
anarchic and pirate cultures). 
 217. See Digital Content Production, supra note 88, at 285 (“Governments 
should encourage creative industries to operate on a more formal [financial] basis 
by easing regulatory barriers and offering affirmative assistance to professionalize 
operations.”). 
 218. See Evuleocha, supra note 174, at 409 (noting that Nigerian firms cannot 
afford the litigation costs to enforce their copyrights abroad); see also Athique, 
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Moreover, difficulties in arranging authorized distributors often leave 
pirate networks as the default providers. The transaction costs of 
long-distance enforcement are a serious deterrent, particularly for 
small producers. Nigerian producers do not even pursue simple, low-
cost measures such as registering U.S. copyrights in their works or 
taking advantage of YouTube ContentID filtering mechanisms—not 
because these measures cost too much, but because Nigerian 
producers either do not appreciate the benefits of such precautions 
for enforcement or doubt the utility of even trying to enforce their 
rights.219 
Furthermore, basic mechanisms for copyright clearance need to be 
instituted before Nollywood films can enjoy distribution through 
conventional channels.220 Global distributors are unwilling to assume 
liability for films that incorporate unauthorized content and typically 
require extensive warranties, documentation, and insurance. Such 
clearance mechanisms are routine in developed countries and need 
not entail undue costs. However, developing the institutional 
 
supra note 96, at 704 (noting similar constraints apply to Indian film industries). 
 219. The American affiliate of the Filmmakers Association of Nigeria has 
launched a campaign to register U.S. copyrights for African films and to 
coordinate U.S. enforcement efforts.  See US Copyright Registration and 
Enforcement for African Films and Music, FILMMAKERS ASSOCIATION OF NIGERIA 
U.S.A. (Sept. 10, 2008), http://www.fanmovieland.com/site/ 
copyrightinitiative.htm. Timely registration of U.S. copyrights enables 
rightsholders to seek statutory damages—up to $150,000 per act of willful 
infringement—without the need to prove actual injury. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006). 
The availability of such relief can be crucial to making infringement actions viable. 
However, without a credible means to pursue such infringement actions, the 
culture of impunity surrounding pirate distribution of African media remains 
daunting. 
 220. See Pierre Barrot, Epilogue, in NOLLYWOOD: THE VIDEO PHENOMENON IN 
NIGERIA 130, 133–34 (Pierre Barrot ed., Lynn Taylor trans., 2008) (citing use of 
pirated music in movie soundtracks as deterring foreign distribution deals). In 
addition to copyright issues, trademark and publicity rights may also present 
potential obstacles that require clearance. Conversely, trademark licensing also 
presents opportunities in the form of product placement. Nollywood already relies 
on product placement for revenues but typically does so through informal 
mechanisms that could present obstacles should its films be distributed abroad. See 
Augusta Okon, The Untapped Power of Product Placement in Nollywood Movies, 
NIGERIAFILMS.COM (Dec. 4, 2010), http://www.nigeriafilms.com/news/9942/12/ 
the-untapped-power-of-product-placement-in-nollywo.html (describing the rise of 
product placement in Nollywood). Major Western sponsors are unlikely to engage 
with Nollywood until it cleans up its act. 
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capacity to generate the requisite paperwork requires expertise 
generally lacking in Nigeria and other developing countries.221  
Finally, Nigeria would benefit from more effective regulation of 
its CROs. The music industry has been stymied by a regulatory 
dispute between rival claimants.222 Film distribution is controlled by 
a shadowy group of “marketers,” one step removed from outright 
pirates.223 Introducing more competition, dynamic leadership, and 
technological innovation could greatly expand the revenue potential 
of Nigerian creators.224 More effective interface with international 
CROs could also lead to a net inflow of revenues from exploitation 
of Nigerian content overseas.225  
 
 221. See WIPO, From Script to Screen: The Importance of Copyright in the 
Distribution of Films 42–57, WIPO Pub. No. 950(E) (2011) (by Rob H. Aft & 
Charles-Edouard Renault), available at http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ip-
development/en/creative_industry/pdf/950.pdf (relating that potential distributors 
need basic documents “to know with certainty” that relevant copyright permissions 
have been secured according to a transparent chain of title); Beyond Culture vs. 
Commerce, supra note 76, at 124 n.364 (noting that assembling the requisite 
paperwork and learning to work within global distribution networks can be 
daunting for emerging filmmakers). 
 222. COSON Illegal Until..., VANGUARD (Mar. 10, 2011, 7:47 PM), 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2011/03/coson-illegal-until/ (reporting a conflict 
between the Copyright Society of Nigeria and the Musical Copyright Society of 
Nigeria, which has been referred to the WIPO by the Nigerian Attorney General). 
 223. Rice, supra note 150, at 39. 
 224. ADEJOKE O. OYEWUNMI, TOWARDS THE SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT OF 
NIGERIA’S ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY IN THE DIGITAL AGE—WHAT ROLE FOR 
COPYRIGHT LAW AND ADMINISTRATION? 13–14, 28–29 (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with the author). The state’s own role in overseeing and regulating CROs 
also needs to be carefully structured. See Schlatter, supra note 194, at 57–69 
(describing pitfalls of both private and public models). 
 225. See Jeff Price, How They Legally Steal Your Money, TuneCore (July 7, 
2011), http://blog.tunecore.com/2011/07/how-they-legally-steal-your-money.html 
(noting substantial sums of money rightfully due to artists and publishers from 
overseas CROs often go uncollected). Alan Story worries that gains to African 
musicians would be dwarfed by payments flowing out to global record labels. 
Story, supra note 26, at 775–76. Yet, his analysis underestimates the strong 
preference in many developing countries for locally produced content. See Omar 
Lizardo, Understanding the Flow of Symbolic Goods in the Global Cultural 
Economy, 45 INT’L J. CONTEMP. SOC. 13, 24–25 (2008) (explaining the strong 
preference in many developing countries for locally produced content); Tyler 
Cowen, Economic Scene; For Some Developing Countries, America’s Popular 
Culture Is Resistible, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/ 
02/22/business/22scene.html (same). Conversely, music from developing countries 
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The bottom line is that there is substantial scope for copyright-
related capacity building in Nigeria. The Nigerian experience is 
hardly atypical in this regard.226 Given the manifold benefits that 
homegrown creative industries supply, cultivating such capacity 
should become a developmental priority. We should not expect 
copyright law to work miracles overnight. Building a thriving 
ecology of creative industries may require other supportive policies 
to improve distribution and financing.227 However, well-targeted 
investments in copyright capacity can play an important role in that 
mix. 
While establishing appropriate priorities and overseeing their 
implementation remains a national responsibility, the international 
community has a role to play as well. In the following section, the 
focus shifts to explore this international dimension.  
B. INTERNATIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING 
International capacity building typically functions across a 
North−South axis and, as such, is subject to many of the broader 
tensions endemic to global IP relations.228 For better or worse, much 
 
is increasingly aired on “world music” radio programs, demonstrating a growing 
appetite for such music internationally. See Megan Romer, Reader Submissions: 
World Music Radio Show List, ABOUT.COM, http://worldmusic.about.com/u/ 
sty/radiostationsprograms/WorldMusicRadioShows/ (last visited Aug. 11, 2012) 
(listing a variety of world music radio stations that showcase music from 
developing countries). 
 226. See Athique, supra note 96, at 704 (noting initiatives taken by the Indian 
government to reduce losses to piracy); Schlatter, supra note 194, at 57–61 
(underscoring the need for better governance of CROs in developing world); 
Schultz & van Gelder, supra note 50, at 143–46 (arguing that more effective 
copyright enforcement mechanisms could fuel creative development across 
Africa). 
 227. Karaganis, supra note 27, at 65; see also Digital Content Production, supra 
note 88, at 283–86 (arguing for an indirect subsidy model based on investments in 
creative infrastructure); Beyond Culture vs. Commerce, supra note 76, at 127 
(proposing a global “diversity quota” to encourage investment in alternative 
cinema). 
 228. See CAROLYN DEERE-BIRKBECK & RON MARCHANT, INT’L CTR. FOR 
TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PRINCIPLES OF THE 
WIPO DEVELOPMENT AGENDA AND THEIR PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION 1 
(ICTSD Issue Paper No. 28, 2010), available at 
http://ictsd.org/i/publications/74518/ (noting that debates about capacity building 
between developed and developing nations turn on fundamentally different 
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of the relevant expertise remains concentrated in developed 
countries. The key is to translate this expertise into technical-
assistance programs that make sense for developing countries.  
This is not a new problem. WIPO’s capacity-building efforts date 
back several decades, and the 1994 TRIPS Agreement made 
providing technical assistance to developing countries a legal duty of 
developed member states.229 WIPO today has developed an extensive 
repertoire of capacity-building initiatives.230 It continues to dominate 
the field and has a hand in coordinating efforts by many others. 
However, a fair amount of assistance is also provided by developed 
countries on a bilateral basis. Moreover, other international 
organizations have their own programs, and private industry groups 
and NGOs are important players as well.231 
Ideally, such programs would communicate a broad range of 
perspectives and options. They would provide balanced information 
covering both rights and limitations that takes into account each 
country’s specific needs and goals.232 The aim would be to empower 
developing countries to set their own priorities in the IP field, while 
equipping them with the technical know-how to both implement and 
adapt established models.233 
 
conceptions “about the role of IP in development”). 
 229. Id. at 3 (observing that funding for technical assistance has increased over 
the years); TRIPS Agreement, supra note 128, art. 67 (“[D]eveloped country 
members shall provide . . . technical and financial cooperation in favour of 
developing and least-developed country Members.”). 
 230. WIPO Building Respect for IP Newsletter: March 2011, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/enforcement/en/news/2011/enforcement_03.html (last visited 
Aug. 12, 2012) (providing a list of capacity-building activities). 
 231. See DEERE-BIRKBECK & MARCHANT, supra note 228, at 4–5 (noting efforts 
to improve collaboration between NGOs and private industry); DE BEER & 
OGUAMANAM, supra note 43, at 6, 22 (discussing technical support offered by 
such varied organizations as WIPO, the African Regional Intellectual Property 
Organization, the U.S. Department of Justice, the European Patent Office, 
Microsoft, and the Ford Foundation). 
 232. See WIPO Development Agenda, supra note 7, nos. 13, 14 (explaining that 
WIPO’s collaboration shall be “development-oriented” and  take “into account the 
priorities and special needs of developing countries”). 
 233. External Review, supra note 146, at 38−39 (defining “development-
orientation” as assistance that is “effective, relevant, and locally-owned,” and 
listing a number of essential elements such as “systematic needs assessments” and 
“choice of projects and providers”); DEERE-BIRKBECK & MARCHANT, supra note 
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It is clear that much international capacity building and technical 
assistance falls short of these ideals. A lack of transparency and 
accountability raises questions as to the value of the assistance 
conferred.234 Conflicts of interest undermine confidence in the 
objectivity of advice; bias toward rightsholder interests seems 
pervasive.235 A focus on treaty compliance has led to rigid “one-size-
fits-all” prescriptions.236 An emphasis on domestic enforcement gives 
short shrift to other priorities.237  
 
228, at 13–17 (discussing how governments must be engaged in the process of 
advancing IP law). 
 234. DEERE-BIRKBECK & MARCHANT, supra note 228, at 6–7 (lamenting lack of 
transparency as to how technical-assistance programs operate and where the 
money is actually spent); Kirsten M. Koepsel, How Do Developed Countries Meet 
Their Obligations Under Article 67 of the TRIPS Agreement?, 44 IDEA 167, 205–
07 (2004) (describing the lack of oversight by the TRIPS Council in regulating the 
delivery of technical assistance). 
 235. External Review, supra note 146, at vii, xii (contending that WIPO remains 
more responsive to rightsholder interests than to civil society representatives); 
DEERE-BIRKBECK & MARCHANT, supra note 228, at 7–9 (observing that IP 
officials in developing countries seldom communicate with other government 
agencies and often develop stronger relationships with foreign donors than they do 
with domestic policy-makers focused on economic development); William New, 
WIPO Defends Involvement in IP Enforcement Meeting in the Philippines, INTELL. 
PROP. WATCH (Oct. 24, 2001, 7:29 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2011/ 
10/24/wipo-defends-involvement-in-ip-enforcement-meeting-in-the-philippines/ 
[hereinafter WIPO Defends] (reporting criticism of WIPO for being perceived as 
overly beholden to foreign rightsholder interests); cf. WIPO Development Agenda, 
supra note 7, no. 6 (calling for technical assistance staff to avoid potential conflicts 
of interest). While most critiques of international capacity building have focused 
on WIPO’s efforts, anecdotal evidence (and common sense) suggests technical 
assistance provided by national governments is even more susceptible to such 
biases. See Peter Drahos, “Trust Me”: Patent Offices in Developing Countries, 34 
AM. J.L. & MED. 151, 160–163 (2008) (critiquing the technocratic trust developed 
between patent officials in developing countries with their counterparts in 
developed countries creating a bias toward foreign rightsholder interests); William 
New, US, WIPO Training Programme on IP Rights in Africa Comes Under Fire, 
INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Feb. 12, 2012, 12:43 PM), http://www.ip-watch.org/ 
2012/02/12/us-wipo-training-programme-on-ip-rights-in-africa-comes-under-fire/ 
(criticizing the perceived bias in a U.S.-sponsored IP Forum in Africa). 
 236. DE BEER & OGUAMANAM, supra note 43, at vi (criticizing “one-size-fits-
all” prescriptions, “which tended to prevail in the design of IP norms and the 
delivery of IP technical assistance”); CHRISTOPHER MAY, THE WORLD 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION: RESURGENCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT 
AGENDA 61–65 (2007) (same). 
 237. DE BEER & OGUAMANAM, supra note 43, at 22 (noting that WIPO’s 
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Such an unbalanced emphasis is hardly surprising because, from 
the standpoint of developed-country providers, inducing developing 
countries to enforce IP rights is the whole point. Noble sentiments 
about incentivizing innovation are all very well, but the main goal 
remains stopping “those people from stealing our stuff.” More 
effective enforcement directly benefits the export interests of content 
and technology industries in developed countries. Therefore, expert 
consultants drawn from these industries or furnished by their 
governments naturally push enforcement to the fore. Perhaps not 
coincidentally, a focus on domestic enforcement is also built into the 
language of TRIPS article 67.238  
A constant refrain of capacity building critics and reformers is that 
technical assistance should be more “demand driven” and 
“development oriented.”239 The first phrase, “demand driven,” speaks 
largely to process concerns. It calls for formal needs assessments and 
consultations with public and private stakeholders to determine 
priorities and increase local “buy-in.”240 By contrast, “development 
oriented” speaks to substantive concerns; however, the meaning of 
this mantra remains ill defined.241 
 
technical and capacity-building support is essentially enforcement oriented); WIPO 
Defends, supra note 235 (describing a recent WIPO meeting dedicated to 
enforcement issues); William New, Lines of Global Enforcement Debate Surface 
at WIPO Meeting, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Dec. 5, 2011, 9:05 AM), http://www.ip-
watch.org/2011/12/05/lines-of-global-enforcement-debate-surface-at-wipo-
meeting/ (reporting concerns over enforcement emphasis in global IP discourse). 
 238. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 128, art. 67 (calling for developed countries 
to assist with the “protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights . . . 
[which] shall include support regarding the establishment or reinforcement of 
domestic offices and agencies relevant to these matters” (emphasis added)). 
 239. See WIPO Development Agenda, supra note 7, no. 13 (“WIPO’s legislative 
assistance shall be, inter alia, development-oriented and demand-driven, taking 
into account the priorities and the special needs of developing countries . . . .”); 
DEERE-BIRKBECK & MARCHANT, supra note 228, at 13 (positing that technical 
assistance should promote local business and take into account other development 
needs such as public health); External Review, supra note 146, at vi (noting that 
the idea of “demand-driven” needs to emphasize mutual contributions). 
 240. See DEERE-BIRKBECK & MARCHANT, supra note 228, at 14–15 
(recommending that governments should include industry representatives in its 
discussions with WIPO). But see External Review, supra note 146, at 39 
(cautioning that demand-driven assistance does not require WIPO to blindly 
acquiesce to requests that would be harmful). 
 241. DEERE-BIRKBECK & MARCHANT, supra note 228, at 7–8 (observing that the 
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Advocates of a development-oriented approach contemplate a 
holistic vision that integrates IP rights with broader developmental 
objectives, taking full account of local circumstances.242 Proponents 
of development-oriented technical assistance also seek a more 
balanced approach to the IP system. To some, such “re-balancing” 
means placing more emphasis on the flexibilities that IP treaties 
enable. Development-oriented capacity building, in this view, 
essentially follows the subtractionist template described at the outset 
of this article.243  
However, such “negative” strategies do not exhaust the gamut of 
development-oriented reforms. There is ample scope to “accentuate 
the positive” by redirecting “affirmative” IP capacity building toward 
more development-oriented goals. The overarching challenge is for 
developing countries to develop IP regimes that serve their own 
interests. This means ensuring that, where rightsholder interests align 
with societal goals, they are supported by well-designed institutions 
that function effectively.  
A paramount priority should be empowering domestic innovation. 
This would entail a fundamental reorientation of existing capacity-
building efforts, which, as noted, tend to prioritize domestic 
enforcement mechanisms. Developing countries share an interest in 
strengthening their domestic enforcement capabilities to some 
degree. However, enforcement is only one way to “latch on to the 
affirmative” potential of IP law. For many developing countries, the 
real need is to support local entrepreneurs in navigating the IP 
system across all its facets—acquisition, licensing, and enforcement, 
 
WIPO “has not developed a comprehensive program or methodology” for its 
technical-assistance programs); External Review, supra note 146, at vi (noting 
“confusion . . . about the meaning of the term ‘demand-driven’”). 
 242. External Review, supra note 146, at 39 (emphasizing that WIPO assistance 
must consider how intellectual property laws create opportunities within the larger 
development process). Such contextual sensitivity lends itself to the strategic 
priority setting suggested in the preceding section—making IP capacity building 
more of an “a la carte” exercise than a totalizing commitment. See DEERE-
BIRKBECK & MARCHANT, supra note 228, at 15 (arguing that IP can only promote 
innovation and development as part of a holistic approach that integrates other 
policies related to economic development). 
 243. See DEERE-BIRKBECK & MARCHANT, supra note 228, at 6 (describing the 
view that technical assistance should focus on “technology transfer, compulsory 
licensing regimes, and countering anti-competitive behaviour by IP right-holders”). 
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both offensively and defensively, at home and abroad.244 To 
implement such a nativist approach to development, technical 
assistance needs to adopt a system-wide approach to the IP system. 
The overarching aim should be to empower domestic stakeholders to 
exploit both the rights and flexibilities of IP law to their full 
advantage.  
Such efforts are perhaps most advanced in the patent realm. WIPO 
devotes the lion’s share of its technical assistance budget to building 
“industrial” IP capacity and offers a rich array of patent and 
innovation-related services.245 Moreover, several developing 
countries have implemented their own technology-transfer programs 
to move research from the laboratory to the market.246 Some have 
also devised innovative initiatives to support domestic entrepreneurs 
by, for example, charging specific government agencies with helping 
inventors procure and enforce patents, search for existing patents, 
and learn about potentially useful technology.247 Such proactive uses 
 
 244. See id. at 6 (noting that “many developing countries . . . emphasise the need 
for greater support for local companies, scientists, and artists to make use of the IP 
system to boost local development and protect their own inventions and creations 
on the international market.”). 
 245. External Review, supra note 146, at v, vii (criticizing the emphasis on 
industrial property given the neglected potential of creative industries); cf. Patents, 
WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/ (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) (describing 
various patent-related services and resources provided by WIPO); TISC 
Technology and Innovation Support Centers, WIPO, 
http://www.wipo.int/patentscope/en/programs/tisc/index.html (last visited Sept. 2, 
2012) (describing the network of WIPO Technology and Innovation Support 
Centers). 
 246. See, e.g., Chunjuan Luan et al., Patent Strategy in Chinese Universities: A 
Comparative Perspective, 84 SCIENTOMETRICS 53, 59 (2010) (noting legislation 
encouraging universities to file patents on government-funded research); Saez, 
supra note 68 (same). 
 247. See Promotion of Inventiveness, supra note 71, at 486–88 (describing role 
of patent office in disseminating information on existing patents and alerting 
domestic industry to potentially relevant technology); Christina the Alchemist, 
ECONOMIST, Nov. 5, 2011, http://www.economist.com/node/21536542/print 
(describing Argentina’s program to help domestic inventors secure foreign patent 
rights and defray overseas procurement and enforcement costs); Mike Masnick, 
How China Is Boosting Patents: Make Professors File Free Patent Applications to 
Get Tenure, TECHDIRT, http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110203/05001812940/ 
how-china-is-boosting-patents-make-professors-file-free-patent-applications-to-
get-tenure.shtml (Mar. 1, 2011, 4:50 AM) (reporting that the Chinese government 
is encouraging professors to file patents by tying those filings to their chances of 
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of patent institutions should be emulated in the copyright domain.  
Far less effort has been devoted to copyright-related capacity 
building either domestically or internationally.248 As noted, such 
comparative neglect reflects a complex of biases that privilege 
industrial over cultural rights in global policy.249 As a result, WIPO 
appears to have been less proactive in engaging with the needs of 
emerging creative industries than it has with its patent and 
technology initiatives. WIPO does offer an impressive array of 
copyright-focused materials on its website.250 However, while these 
materials provide useful descriptions of how IP rights function in 
creative industries generally, they arguably give short shrift to the 
practical problem solving required to implement such models in 
developing countries.251 Such neglect is troubling in light of the 
comparative advantage that most developing countries have in 
developing copyright-reliant industries compared with patent.252 
 
receiving tenure); Saez, supra note 68 (describing steps to facilitate intellectual 
property in the Philippines that include education about which inventions are 
patentable and how to commercialize the patent); NAT’L OFFICE FOR TECH. 
ACQUISITION & PROMOTION, http://notap.gov.ng/content/activities (last visited 
Aug. 12, 2012) (stating that the Nigerian National Office of Technology 
Acquisition and Promotion will draft patents on behalf of inventors). 
 248. External Review, supra note 146, at vii, xxxi. But see id. at 104 (describing 
WIPOCOS and AFRICOS initiatives to improve CRO efficiency). 
 249. See, e.g., supra note 147–149 and accompanying text. 
 250. See, e.g., Publications, WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/ 
creative_industry/publications.html (last visited Aug. 12, 2012) (offering 
informational booklets on different aspects of copyright law). 
 251. Cf. Steven Jamar, A Lawyering Approach to Law and Development, 27 
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 31, 33–34 (2001) (lamenting approaches to legal 
development based on institution building and arguing instead for a “bottom up” 
focus on developing practical skills that lawyers can use to solve real-world 
problems). Much of WIPO’s recent energy appears to have focused on measuring 
the economic contribution of creative industries rather than investigating the 
practical challenges that such industries face in exploiting their copyrights. Cf. 
WIPO, WIPO STUDIES ON THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF THE COPYRIGHT 
INDUSTRIES 26 (2012), available at http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/ 
creative_industry/pdf/economic_contribution_analysis_2012.pdf. Such research 
undoubtedly holds considerable value for informing high-level policy. However, 
such “top-down” efforts need to be supplemented with more pragmatic assistance 
to bolster the legal and commercial capabilities such emerging industries require. 
 252. External Review, supra note 146, at 119 (noting that “[i]n the copyright 
area, [developing countries] called on WIPO to boost attention to the 
modernization of copyright offices and collective management societies.”). None 
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Given the developmental potential afforded by creative industries 
already described, a shift in emphasis seems overdue. Hopefully, 
WIPO’s recently announced African audiovisual initiative will prove 
a harbinger of broader changes in this direction.253 
As the Nollywood case study showed, there is ample scope for 
capacity building in the copyright realm. Copyright regimes may not 
require formalities as a precondition for protection; however, using 
copyrights effectively is a different matter. Exploiting creative 
content in a sophisticated manner requires substantial legal, 
technical, and commercial expertise. Such know-how remains in 
short supply in most developing countries. Governments should look 
to bolster their own internal capacity and then develop mechanisms 
to leverage such expertise on behalf of industry. Copyright offices 
and cultural ministries need to bring the same proactive, client-
oriented focus to building creative industries as their patent-oriented 
counterparts have begun to do in technology sectors.254  
This may include stepped-up enforcement but also maintaining 
voluntary registries for rights management information, conducting 
outreach to local authors and publishers, educating the public on the 
copyright system, and providing assistance with the copyright 
clearance paperwork required for foreign distribution. Such efforts 
should eschew ideological stances in favor of pragmatic, real-world 
solutions; for example, providing guidance on open-licensing models 
as well as closed ones would present rightsholders with a broader 
 
of this is to discount the critical importance of technology for development. The 
point is merely that, for many developing countries, the relative benefits of 
investing in patent systems as a means to facilitate technological development are 
less manifest. See Patents on a Shoestring, supra note 11, at 762 (noting concern 
that patents impede access to technology). By contrast, copyright does not exert 
nearly the same blocking effects, and the competitive playing field is more level. 
 253. Cf. WIPO, CDIP, Strengthening and Development of the Audiovisual 
Sector in Burkina Faso and Certain African Countries, 9th Sess., WIPO Doc. 
CDIP/9/13 (Apr. 4, 2012) (describing a major WIPO capacity-building initiative to 
strengthen Africa’s film industry). 
 254. Cf. Adebambo Adewopo, Intellectual Property Regime and the Global 
Financial Crisis: Lessons from Nigeria, 14 J. MONEY LAUNDERING CONTROL 183, 
186−89 (2011) (praising Nigeria’s STRAP initiative as a proactive, multifaceted 
program); DE BEER & OGUAMANAM, supra note 43, at 23−25 (criticizing 
enforcement bias of STRAP, while praising other Nigerian copyright initiatives). 
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array of options.255 Nor should governments necessarily occupy the 
central role in such initiatives. Where industry associations offer 
more effective conduits, capacity building should encompass them.  
Developing such internal capacity-building initiative will likely 
require external help; outside consultants can supply critical 
expertise. Developing countries need to be discriminating 
consumers, drawing upon a diverse range of advisers and viewpoints, 
drawn from both Northern and Southern providers.256 Moreover, 
developing countries should not hesitate to question the received 
wisdoms reflected in such advice. Existing models need to be 
adapted to local contexts, and IP rights need to serve development 
interests. IP institutions need to be configured accordingly. To do so 
will require sustained effort and experimentation. There is also a 
need for development-oriented research and scholarship that moves 
beyond ideological debates to focus on practical problem solving.  
Copyright systems, in particular, need to take into account digital 
challenges that have upended existing models. Just as mobile 
technologies have allowed developed countries to leapfrog wired 
infrastructure and develop innovative e-commerce models, so too, 
developing countries  have an opportunity to bypass outdated legal 
standards and pioneer twenty-first-century models.257 Concrete 
measures such as implementing digital rights-management systems 
 
 255. DE BEER & OGUAMANAM, supra note 43, at 25−27 (noting efforts to 
improve training on IP in developing countries to include areas such as open IP 
licenses). 
 256. DEERE-BIRKBECK & MARCHANT, supra note 228, at 16 (describing “vast 
quantities of assistance, training, and international travel opportunities available” 
as enabling countries to “select their source of [technical assistance], choosing 
providers they deem most likely to address their needs”); External Review, supra 
note 146, at xxii (proposing that WIPO adopt guidelines to ensure transparency in 
the selection of technical assistance advice from a wide variety of experts). 
 257. See Labbe, supra, note 69, at 424 (noting that Kenya’s embrace of mobile 
banking was facilitated by a lack of preexisting regulations that would have 
encumbered such innovation). Digital challenges admittedly remain complex and 
imperfectly understood. Devising appropriate responses has bedeviled 
commentators and policy-makers everywhere. However, developing countries 
have a potential advantage. Because they can approach IP systems essentially as 
“green field construction,” they have less need to maneuver around regulatory 
barriers and vested interests in reaching for innovative solutions. Capacity building 
to encourage such innovation could thus yield lessons of global value. 
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would be a useful start.258 There is also scope for experimentation 
with novel business models facilitated through digital intermediaries, 
which comprise options for both distribution259 and enforcement.260  
To support such innovative approaches to building development-
oriented IP systems, there is also room for innovation in the means 
by which international capacity-building assistance is supplied. We 
should think more carefully about where specific IP capabilities 
would be most efficiently located: at the multinational, national, or 
local levels, as well as public vs. private sectors.261 We should 
 
 258. See supra note 38 and accompanying text; see also Gurry, supra note 26, at 
10 (suggesting that WIPO implement a digital rights regime). 
 259. See, e.g., Claire Miller, YouTube Ads Turn Videos into Revenue, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/03/technology/ 
03youtube.html (describing a YouTube program to share revenue from 
advertisements with copyright holders); Ben Sisario, Out to Shake Up Music, Often 
with Sharp Words, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2012/05/07/business/tunecore-chief-shakes-up-music-with-his-own-words.html 
?pagewanted=all (describing TuneCore’s “revolutionary” flat-rate distribution 
model). 
 260. See Eriq Gardner, The Righthaven Experiment: A Journalist Wonders if a 
Copyright Troll Was Right to Sue Him, ABA J., May 2012, 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/the_righthaven_experiment_a_journa
list_wonders_if_a_copyright_troll_was_rig/ (describing the Righthaven business 
model based on purchasing litigation rights and launching mass-volume 
enforcement actions against copyright infringement online). See Karaganis, supra 
note 27, at 27 (noting the ability of corporate enforcement groups to “self-finance 
through settlements”); Nate Anderson, The RIAA? Amateurs. Here’s How You Sue 
14,000+ P2P Users, ARSTECHNICA (June 1, 2010, 8:38 PM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/06/the-riaa-amateurs-heres-how-
you-sue-p2p-users.ars (noting the effectiveness of private action peer-to-peer file-
sharing lawsuits compared to those brought by the Recording Industry Association 
of America). There are legitimate questions regarding the way some of these firms 
have played fast and loose with procedural niceties. See Copyright Trolls, ELEC. 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/copyright-trolls (last visited Sept. 2, 
2012) (reporting how IP enforcement suits will often lump disparate defendants 
together and implicate massive damages to force settlements). However, the point 
is that outsourcing enforcement can be cost-effective, and rightsholders should not 
hesitate to explore its potential for legitimate aims. 
 261. Rather than replicate a full spectrum of capabilities within every national 
system, some tasks are more effectively outsourced to centralized providers—
WIPO’s PATENTSCOPE and Patent Information Services offer a case in point. 
TISC Technology and Innovation Support Centers, supra note 245 (noting that 
projects to advance access to technology services are done in cooperation with 
national and regional governments within the framework of an international 
agenda). In other contexts, distributed arrangements that push capabilities to the 
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develop more flexible delivery mechanisms. Top-down models of 
technical assistance should be supplemented by more flexible, 
decentralized arrangements. For example, e-mentoring and pro-
bono counsel can deliver context-specific expertise on demand, 
directly to private stakeholders.262 Professional development 
through internships in government and industry can also supply 
practical training and insight into real-world problem solving.263 
Collaboration between similarly situated developing countries 
should be similarly encouraged.264  
In addition, IP capacity building should be better integrated with 
broader development initiatives. Rather than a narrow technical 
domain monopolized by specialists, IP rights should be viewed 
holistically as functioning within broader creative, commercial, and 
technological ecologies.265 Creative industries in developing 
countries are already the recipients of a diverse array of assistance. 
Many countries have specific policies to support cultural enterprises, 
for example. Indeed, developing countries have been innovators in 
this field.266 Various NGOs and intergovernmental organizations also 
 
local level or focus on industry clusters may be preferred. Sisario, supra note 259. 
 262. Aerni & Rüegger, supra note 69, at 440–44 (highlighting how e-mentoring 
can help overcome bottlenecks in providing IP education); PUB. INTEREST 
INTELLECTUAL PROP. ADVISORS, www.piipa.org (last visited Sept. 2, 2012) 
(describing Public Interest Intellectual Property Advisors’ efforts to provide IP 
expertise to both public and private stakeholders in developing countries). 
 263. See Peter Yu, How to Design Development-Oriented Intellectual Property 
Training 18 (draft manuscript) (on file with author). 
 264. External Review, supra note 146, at xii (explaining that partnerships 
between similarly situated countries can create mutual support as parties learn 
from each other). Because existing templates need to be adapted to the 
development context, other developing countries may harbor expertise and 
experience in grappling with common issues and challenges entailed. Cf. Aerni & 
Rüegger, supra note 69, at 437–38 (describing tacit knowledge and practical 
problem solving harbored in developing countries). The Washington Declaration’s 
call for greater South−South cooperation in this regard is thus extremely well 
taken. Cf. Washington Declaration, supra note 17, at 5. 
 265. DEERE-BIRKBECK & MARCHANT, supra note 228, at 13 (emphasizing that 
technical assistance should not be merely reactive to developments in international 
treaty law). 
 266. See Beyond Culture vs. Commerce, supra note 76, at 119–20 (describing 
indirect subsidies to Indian regional film industries); Digital Content Production, 
supra note 88, at 271–74 (describing Brazil’s Culture Point initiative to empower 
digital creativity). 
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operate a plethora of programs to nurture the growth and diversity 
potential of creative industries.267 Yet such cultural and commercial 
initiatives often betray either an ambivalent attitude to or a simplistic 
understanding of intellectual property rights.268 Conversely, providers 
of technical assistance on the IP side often operate in an isolated silo 
that ignores such cultural and commercial initiatives.269 
Furthermore, more should be done to develop transnational IP 
capabilities to support creative industries whose content is distributed 
abroad. As noted, technical assistance can overcome critical export 
bottlenecks. Here too, advising on transnational licensing and 
enforcement should be integrated with commercial and technological 
strategies. That said, there is plenty to do within purely legal 
 
 267. See, e.g., SAGNIA, supra note 95, at 1; Creative and Cultural Economy, 
BRITISH COUNCIL, http://creativeconomy.britishcouncil.org/ (last visited Sept. 2, 
2012); Projects, THE GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR CULTURAL DIVERSITY, 
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=31465&URL_DO=DO_ 
TOPIC&URL_SECTION=-477.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2012). 
 268. The staff employed by such agencies typically has a background in 
economics or international relations. As such, they may lack detailed knowledge of 
the nuances of IP law, let alone practical experience grappling with the real-world 
challenges that IP rightsholders must navigate. The 2010 UNCTAD/UNDP report 
offers a revealing example: its 300-plus pages encompass a superficially 
impressive chapter on IP rights. Yet closer examination reveals this chapter to be 
nothing more than a descriptive primer on the sources and scope of IP law. When 
the report gets down to advising on the use of these rights, its recommendations are 
confined to two solitary paragraphs, which acknowledge that “copyright is of little 
economic value if these rights cannot be enforced.” Sadly, the report offers zero 
guidance on how to combat the piracy problem other than a bizarre call for 
“transparency.” UNCTAD Report, supra note 76, at 177. 
 269. DEERE-BIRKBECK & MARCHANT, supra note 228, at 9 (charging that a lack 
of contextual awareness feeds into the misconception that IP issues are not 
connected with broader development concerns); External Review, supra note 146, 
at 12 (pointing out that the contemporaneous shift of WIPO’s focus toward  
development activities and UNDP’s reduction of its own IP programs effectively 
separated WIPO from broader U.N. goals on development). A notable exception is 
the World Bank’s African Music Project, which—in its initial conception—
demonstrated an admirably holistic approach that integrated an IP rights 
management strategy with its commercial and technological initiative. As such, it 
supplies a template from which successor initiatives could draw useful lessons. See 
generally Frank J. Penna et al., The African Music Project, in POOR PEOPLE’S 
KNOWLEDGE: PROMOTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
95, 95–112 (J. Michael Finger & Phillip Schuler eds., 2004) (highlighting that the 
project has improved the musicians’ methods of revenue collection and has 
reduced piracy). 
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domains. Regional IP organizations have typically focused on 
patents and trademarks, not copyright.270 As digital content flows 
increasingly disregard borders, legal mechanisms need to adapt.271 
Even rudimentary steps to promote greater regional and transnational 
cooperation and to move toward standardized record keeping could 
pay dividends.272  
Moreover, there is ample scope for more targeted solutions. The 
“transnational” challenges developing countries face often center on 
specific developed-country markets with concentrated expatriate 
populations.273 Accordingly, capacity building can be designed to 
take advantage of established IP infrastructure in these countries. 
Bilateral initiatives to build transnational licensing and enforcement 
capacity in such diaspora export markets would allow emerging 
producers of creative content to tap into a comparatively wealthy 
customer base. 
While Western content producers may be understandably reluctant 
to offer support for potential competitors to enter their home 
markets, emerging-market producers are not really competing for the 
same audiences. Licensed distribution of Tamil films to the overseas 
Tamil community, for example, would primarily displace pirated 
consumption, not Hollywood blockbusters. Accordingly, a coalition 
of interests could be exploited. Developing countries should demand 
transnational assistance in return for their commitment to enforce 
copyright norms.274 For their part, Western governments and content 
 
 270. See, e.g., Park, supra note 214, at 698–708 (describing the industrial 
property focus of two regional African organizations). 
 271. See Neil Conley, Future of Licensing Music Online, 25 J. MARSHALL J. 
COMPUTER & INFO. L. 409, 482–85 (2008) (noting that CROs justify their 
territorial licensing by arguing that closeness to rightsholders allows for better 
services, but arguing that allowing for multi-territorial licensing would create 
better music platforms). 
 272. See, e.g., CISAC Trains MCSN Staff, VANGUARD (Nov. 20, 2009), 
http://www.vanguardngr.com/2009/11/cisac-trains-mcsn-staff/ (noting that 
collaboration between the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and 
Composers and the South African Recording Rights Association Limited to 
standardize copyright data, allowing interoperable record-keeping between sister 
societies). 
 273. Athique, supra note 96, at 713–14; DE BEER & OGUAMANAM, supra note 
43, at 23. 
 274. Cf. JR Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS 
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industries would reap public relation dividends by showing that they 
take all piracy seriously everywhere, as opposed to just piracy of 
their products overseas.275 In the long run, Hollywood may have 
more to gain from enlisting allies among emerging creative 
industries than it would lose from increased competition.276 
Finally, attention should be directed toward broader structural 
reforms to make the global copyright system more hospitable to the 
diverse content emanating from developing countries. Such a project 
implicates many components on which space here does not permit 
elaboration. However, one logical focus of such efforts would be 
reforms directed at collective rights management regimes to ensure 
greater openness to diverse constituents and a more transparent 
allocation of benefits.277 Ensuring that creativity is thereby rewarded 
 
Agreement: The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate 
Worldwide Intellectual Property Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 
15–16 (1998) (suggesting that intellectual property rules should be subject to 
ongoing bargaining between public and private actors in developed and developing 
countries, based on mutual interests). 
 275. Drawing on their existing staff and expertise, the Big Media trade lobbies 
could buy much-needed goodwill by lending assistance to their emerging market 
peers. Simply setting up an information clearinghouse to address basic registration 
and enforcement issues would be a start. 
 276. Hollywood already partners with film industries around the world in co-
production deals driven by short-term profit. However, capacity-building 
partnerships focused on strengthening its partners’ commercial capabilities would 
entail an investment with a longer-term payoff. The idea would be, for example, as 
the Tamil film industry benefits from increased sales, it will lobby Indian policy-
makers and help shape public opinion to oppose piracy and support heightened 
protection. See Karaganis, supra note 27, at 28 (noting that “domestic companies 
and artists are often better able to mobilize attention from local authorities—even 
when representing products embedded in global circuits of investment and 
distribution . . . . For obvious reasons, the politics of copyright enforcement on 
behalf of domestic producers are more attractive . . . than enforcing Microsoft or 
Disney licenses.”). 
 277. Cf. Ivan Reidel, The Taylor Swift Paradox: Superstardom, Excessive 
Advertising and Blanket Licenses, 7 NYU J.L. & BUS. 731 (2011) (arguing that 
blanket licenses by CROs impoverish content diversity, reduce audience welfare, 
and jeopardize the livelihood of artists); Kaitlin Mara, Panelists: Copyright Law’s 
‘Byzantine Maze’ Stalling New Business Models, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (Nov. 9, 
2010 11:30 AM), http://www.ip-watch.org/2010/11/09/panellists-copyright-
law%E2%80%99s-%E2%80%98byzantine-maze%E2%80%99-stalling-new-
business-models/ (reporting the view that outdated copyright laws have led to 
fragmented rights that inhibit digital innovation); Price, supra note 225 (arguing 
that CROs operate needlessly opaque structures that privilege the interests of 
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more equitably would benefit developing countries, which are 
disadvantaged under the present order. It would also bring the 
practice of the copyright system in closer alignment with its 
theoretical rationales. 
C. TOWARD A PRO-IP DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 
Efforts to remake capacity building in a more development-
oriented guise are already under way, and the need to encourage 
domestic innovation has been recognized. The WIPO Development 
Agenda included several recommendations on technical assistance 
and capacity building that focus on helping developing countries 
harness the affirmative potential of intellectual property law.278 These 
recommendations reflect the strong interest among many developing 
countries, particularly those in Africa, in exploring IP’s upside.  
However, the Development Agenda, while promising, remains 
incomplete. It pays too little heed to the need for transnational 
capacity building. It fails to rectify the misplaced emphasis on patent 
vs. copyright. Moreover, it has left ambiguous the meaning of 
“development orientation.” This lodestar requires both substantive 
elaboration and concrete implementation. 
Subtractionists seek to “balance” capacity building by addressing 
concerns over conflicts of interest, transparency, and accountability. 
They advocate a “holistic approach” to IP that places more emphasis 
on flexibilities and limitations, and less on enforcement. However, 
framing an effective development agenda for IP requires more than 
injecting balance and eliminating conflicts. Whatever “balanced” 
package of IP rights emerges will be wasted unless they can be used 
in practice. Foreign multinationals should not remain beneficiaries of 
the IP system by default. 
I have argued for a “nativist” approach to development that would 
reorient capacity building around the needs of domestic innovators, 
with a particular focus on creative industries. I agree that the current 
focus on domestic enforcement needs to be rebalanced toward a 
 
publishers and record labels over artists). 
 278. See WIPO Development Agenda, supra note 7, nos. 2–4, 11 (providing for, 
among other recommendations, assistance to small business and research 
institutions and strengthening capacity for national enforcement of IP rights). 
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more holistic approach to IP. However, my conception of such a 
holistic approach would focus less on substantive norms and more on 
practical problem solving, providing the institutional expertise for 
domestic authors and inventors to commercialize their innovation. 
By focusing solely on flexibilities and technology transfer without 
acknowledging the potential for affirmative capacity-building 
measures, subtractionists perpetuate the misguided impression that 
innovation is something that happens outside the developing world. 
They present IP rights as a threat to development, as opposed to a 
potential contributor. Such one-sided approaches to IP & 
development do a disservice to the developing countries whose 
welfare they ostensibly champion.  
Subtractionists claim to support reasonable levels of IP protection 
and only target “IP maximalism.” Yet, as noted, in the development 
context, “reasonable IP” cannot be assumed as the baseline norm. It 
will take real, sustained effort to realize this ideal. Refocusing 
existing capacity-building initiatives around domestic innovation is 
only the start. The same fresh thinking and openness to 
experimentation that subtractionists demonstrate in proposing 
alternative models to IP rights is needed to adapt the conventional IP 
system to the needs of development. There is likewise a need for 
more evidence-based policies and research to inform existing 
initiatives. Embracing such positive strategies as well as negative 
ones would lend credibility to self-styled advocates of the “public 
interest” by demonstrating their willingness to engage the public 
interest both for and against IP protection.  
V. CONCLUSION 
In opposing agendas for IP maximalism, public interest advocates 
issue a powerful call for sanity and balance. When it comes to 
framing a development agenda, however, their preoccupation with 
the excesses of IP law may itself prove “too much of a good thing.” 
The same rebalancing that subtractionists advocate for the global IP 
system could usefully be applied to their unduly narrow vision of the 
“development interest.” Making IP work for developing countries 
requires a holistic approach that engages both the positive and 
negative potential of IP rights. I have argued that the developmental 
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potential of creative industries is particularly promising. Yet 
copyright has been perversely neglected by existing capacity-
building initiatives, and there is an urgent need to refocus technical 
assistance around the needs of domestic innovators. I hope that 
future articulations of the public interest “development agenda” will 
undertake this challenge in a more even-handed fashion. 
